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ABSTRACT
Nuclear power is the main focus for resource-poor Japan's C02 emissions control because it is
the least-cost technology for power generation and, consequently, of C02 emissions control. Cost-
effectiveness is an essential guideline for technology choice, although not necessarily an optimal
guideline. The lead-time for nuclear power plant development is approaching 25 years and could
present a significant risk, obstructing the implementation of the C02 controls agreed to in Kyoto in
1997.
This thesis reconsiders technology and policy choice for C02 emissions control. It begins by
estimating the risks inherent in the volatile lead-time that is delaying C02 emission control.
Although Japan plans to build 20 nuclear power plants by 2010, it is demonstrated that this plan
involves considerable risk. In addition, this work sheds light on the trade-off between cost-
effectiveness and risk, and demonstrates how technology portfolios which combine nuclear power
and low-risk technologies, such as wind power, reduce this risk. Scenario and sensitivity analysis
incorporate uncertainties in the lead-time and the costs of power generation into technology choice.
Finally, this thesis investigates policy choice. The ongoing deregulation of the utilities has the
potential to conflict with effective C02 emissions control. By analyzing the interaction between
two policies-C02 control and deregulation-this work demonstrates that a tradable certificate
system of carbon-free power generation can resolve potential conflicts and, in fact, harmonize
them. Because of the great gap in cost between nuclear power and other, low-risk technologies,
economic forces such as C02 emissions penalties have little practical effect on technology choice.
In contrast, the tradable certificate system ensures workable technology portfolios and
simultaneously reduces the cost of power generation and C02 emissions control through market-
competition.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Henry D. Jacoby
Title: William F. Pounds Professor of Management
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1. INTRODUCTION
The control of carbon dioxide (C02) emissions is of concern to governments, industries, and
the public, all of whom might be affected by the likely climate change produced by the burning of
fossil fuel. In response to the international concern over global climate change, the Conference of
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP3) was held in
Kyoto in December 1997. As a result of this meeting, Japan and other developed countries agreed
to legally binding targets for C02 emissions. Regardless of international agreements, however, the
most important aspect of emission control remains the effective enforcement by each government
of their own domestic policies.
For Japan's domestic policy, nuclear power is the main focus of C02 control. The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) announced a long-term energy supply and demand
outlook' in June 1994 (ACE, 1994). The report, outlining the long-term energy use requirements
for Japan, argued that 20 nuclear power plants will be required by 2010 to stabilize C02 emissions
at the required 1990 per capita level. Japanese utilities announced a voluntary action plan on the
control of C02 emissions in November 1996 (JFEO, 1997). The plan outlined the efforts that the
utilities would make to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of electricity by about 20% by 2010 as
compared to the 1990 actual emissions throughout the entire electric power industry. Nuclear
power is listed at the top of the measures necessary to achieve this goal.
The rationale behind policies that stress nuclear power focuses on the fact that nuclear power is
the least-cost technology of power generation for resource-poor Japan and, consequently, of C02
emissions control. Because of its enormous influence on the entire economy, the cost-effectiveness
of C02 emissions control is the main concern of the government and the utilities. The cost-
competitiveness of nuclear power is a predominate factor of technology choice.
The COP3 established a timetable as well as numerical targets for C02 emissions control.
Cost-effectiveness is an essential guideline for technology choice, but not necessarily an optimal
guideline because the lead-time for nuclear power plant development is approaching 25 years in
The outlook was prep red by the Advisory Committee for Energy. In response to the agreement of the COP3, the
MITI is revising the outlook. Whether the outlook is a projection or a plan is controversy.
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Japan due to the difficulty in siting new power stations. This long and volatile lead-time could be a
significant risk, obstructing the implementation of C02 emissions control.
In addition, since the amendment of the Electricity Utility Industry Law in 1995, independent
power producers have entered the Japanese utility market. The goal of the deregulation was to
reduce the price of electricity. Low prices, however, can promote high consumption and,
consequently, C02 emissions. Because the existing utilities have an almost exclusive responsibility
to develop nuclear power plants, a nuclear-leaning policy could disturb fair market-competition,
leaving the roles and responsibilities of independent power producers vague. To comply with the
COP3 agreement, C02 emissions control should be consistent with deregulation and vice-versa.
This thesis reconsiders technology choice and policy choice for C02 emissions control of
Japan's utilities. It asks two key questions: how can risk in the implementation be incorporated into
technology choice; and how can two policies-CO2 emissions control and deregulation-be
harmonized?
To answer these questions, chapter two will explore the current C02 emissions control policies
of Japan's government and utilities. Chapter three investigates technology options for C02
emissions control in terms of costs and barriers to implementation. Chapter four demonstrates how
the long lead-time in nuclear plant construction entails the risk of delaying C02 emissions control.
Chapter four also develops technology portfolios to incorporate risks into technology choice,
shedding light on the trade-off between cost-effectiveness and risks. Chapter five discusses policy
choice for C02 emissions control in deregulated markets and analyzes the interaction between C02
emissions control and deregulation in terms of technology portfolios and market-competition,
recommending a tradable certificate system of carbon-free power generation as a workable policy.
Chapter six summarizes the main findings in light of technology and policy choice.
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2. CO2 EMISSIONS AND CONTROL POLICY
This chapter presents an overview of C02 emissions and control policies within Japan's
utilities and government. It begins by exploring current C02 emissions, which is 60% of the United
States' emissions per unit of electricity. The already low C02 emissions in Japan make it difficult
to further reduce C02 emissions both economically and technologically. Secondly, this chapter will
provide an overview of the control policies of Japan's energy utilities and government. Before the
May 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Japan had announced the
Action Program to Arrest Global Warming in October 1990. The goal of this program was to
stabilize C02 emission per capita at the 1990 level by 2000. C02 emissions in 1996 already
exceeds this goal. However, the agreement of the COP3 requires Japan to reduce C02 emissions
below the 1990 level by 6%. The government is now rethinking their policy.
2.1 C02 EMISSIONS
Japan emitted 343 million t-Carbon in 1994. This amount accounts for 4.9% of the total
emissions worldwide. The burning of fossil fiels in the energy sector accounted for 91.7% of
domestic emissions. The remainder was made up of other industrial sources (cement making, etc.)
at 4.5% and the incineration of wastes providing only 3.8% of the total. The utilities account for
29.4% of the domestic emissions (EAJ, 1997a and MFAJ, 1998). Consequently, Japan's utilities
account for 1.4% of total emissions worldwide.
Table 2-1 shows average C02 emissions per unit of electricity among major countries (FEPC,
1998 and IEA 1997). C02 emissions per unit of electricity, or "C02 intensity" of Japan's electrical
power generation, is 63% of that of the United States, and 73% of that of the United Kingdom.
These low emissions are due in large part to the high thermal-efficiency of Japanese power
generation and the large share of nuclear power and natural gas in power sources. Following two
recent oil crises, resource-poor Japan has made every effort to improve energy efficiency and
diversify identified energy resources. These efforts have made the C02 intensity of Japanese
utilities lower than those of other OECD countries.
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Figure 2-1 shows the trend of C02 emissions by the Japanese power utilities (EDMC, 1997).
In the past 30 years, power generation has increased five-fold, although C02 emission has shown
only a four-fold increase. C02 intensity peaked in 1997 then decreased until 1985. Since then, it
has remained generally on the same level. These data suggest that further reduction of C02
emissions will not be easy for Japan's utilities, which face a growth in energy demand.
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Table 2-1 C02 Emission per Unit Electricity and Factors Affecting the Emissions
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Figure 2-1 Trend of C02 emission in Japan's Utilities
2.2 C02 CONTROL POLICY
The government's commitments to C02 emissions control dates back to the Council of
Minister for Global Environment Conservation in May 1989. The Council proposed to the
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international community in June 1990 "the Global Rejuvenation Program". The idea underlying
the program was to rejuvenate the global environment over the next 100 years by launching a
comprehensive, long-term international movement to control C02 emissions. To do so, the program
proposed to expand scientific knowledge of global climate change and to develop and introduce
new clean technologies.
In October 1990, the Council announced "the Action Program to Arrest Global Warming." The
program was a virtual master plan of C02 emissions control that guided policy until COP3 in
December 1997. The historical significance of the "Action Program" was to set up a national target
of C02 emissions control. The target was to stabilize C02 emissions at the 1990 per capita level
from 2000 onward
In July 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held in
Rio de Janeiro. Japan, along with 150 other countries, signed the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. The Convention stipulated that developed countries, including
Japan, should try to reduce C02 emissions to 1990 levels by the end of the decade.
In response to the agreement in Rio, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry revised
the Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook in June 1994. Table 2-2 summarizes the
outlook. While the MITI hedges on whether the Outlook is a plan or a projection, the Outlook
asserts that nuclear power will produce 310 billion kWh by the year 2000 and 480 billion kWh by
2010 so that C02 emissions per capita will be at the 1990 level stabilized from 2000 onward.
Assuming that the capacity for nuclear power plants is 1.35 million kW and the annual
utilization rate is 80%, 20 new plants are necessary to meet the outlook. Since 1966, Japan has
sited 18 nuclear power stations and operated 53 nuclear power plants. Their total capacity was 42.7
million kW and the total output was 302 billion kWh in 1997. Twenty new plants are equal to 38%
of the total capacity of existing plants and 480 billion kWh is 1.6 times larger than the total output
of current facilities.
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Table 2-2 A Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook
1992 2000 2010
(actual)
Final Energy Consumption [million ke*] 360 388 423
Industrial [million kt*] 181 50.3% 187 48.2% 200 47.3%
Residential and Commercial [million kt*] 93 25.8% 109 28.1% 128 30.3%
Transportation [million kc*] 86 23.9% 92 23.7% 95 22.5%
Primary Supply [million kc*] 541 582 635
Oil [million kt] 315 58.2% 308 52.9% 303 47.7%
Coal [million t] 116 16.1% 130 16.4% 134 15.4%
Natural Gas [million t] 41 10.6% 53 12.9% 58 12.8%
Nuclear [billion kWh] 223 10.0% 310 12.3% 480 16.9%
Hydroelectric [billion kWh] 79 3.8% 86 3.4% 105 3.7%
Geothermal [million k*] 0.6 0.1% 1.0 0.2% 3.8 0.6%
New Energies [million kt*] 6.7 1.2% 12.1 2.0% 19.1 3.0%
*: oil equivalent Source: ACE 1994
In addition to nuclear power, the Outlook states the expectations for the expansion of "new
energies." New energies are defined as energies which do not come into conventional energies
listed in Table 2-2. The Outlook expects that new energies will increase by 1.8 times by the year
2000, 2.9 times by the year 2010.
The Outlook itemizes the new forms of energy supply, and defines them as the three "res";
renewable energy such as solar power, waste power generation through recycling of waste
materials2, and renovation of conventional technology such as co-generation. By definition, the
new forms of energy supply involve both conventional energies and new energies.
Table 2-3 itemizes the new forms of energy supply. As shown in Table 2-2, the Outlook
expects that new energies will increase by 1.8 times by the year 2000, and 2.9 times by the year
2010. However, for power generation the increase of new energies is more drastic. For instance,
the Outlook expects that solar power will increase by 10 times by the year 2000 and more than one
thousand times by the year 2010. Similarly, the Outlook expects that wind power will increase by
10 times and 20 times, while waste power generation is expected to increase by 4.5 times and 9
times in the same periods. Nevertheless, the share in the total electricity production is around 1%.
Z This wording contradicts itself. Waste power generation recovers the waste heat of the incineration of waste materials.
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Table 2-3 New Forms of Energy Supply
actual 1992 2000 2010
[thousand kt]* [thousand kc]* [thousand ki]*
Renewable
Solar Power 0.4 40 450
Wind Power 1 10 20
Solar Thermal 1,130 3,000 5,500
Thermal Energy Conversion 6 200 580
Recycle
Waste Power Generation 232 1,060 2,120
Waste Heat Recovery 39 70 140
Others 4,880 5,050 5,390
Renovation
Co-generation 2,770 5,230 8,790
Fuel cell 2 105 1,230
Methanol, Coal Liquefaction 0 0 960
Alternative Transportation Fuel 3 680 3,240
Total ** 9,063 15,340 27,230
*: oil equivalent Source; ACE 1994
**: Fuel cell counts as fuel cell and cogeneration twice.
New forms of energy supply involves conventional energies and new energies.
In September 1994, based on the Outlook, the government reported to the Secretariat of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change convention that C02 emissions in 2000 will be about
330 million t-C (up 10 million t-C or about 3% from 1990) and that per-capita emissions will be
about 2.6 t-C per capita (more or less level with those of 1990). The actual C02 emissions in 1995,
however, already exceeded the prospect of the year 2000 by 2%, which was 8% over 1990 rates.
Figure 2-1 shows the actual records and the prospects of the outlook in terms of primary energy
supply and C02 emissions. Up until 1993, energy supply and demand had stayed at almost
identical levels to the Outlook because of economic stagnation. However, by 1994 primary energy
supply jumped up by 5.4 % per year, leading to C02 emissions that exceeded the projection for the
year 2000, ballooning by 6.1%.
For power generation, the utilities have commissioned 12 nuclear power plants since 1991. As
of 1998, the total capacity of nuclear power is 45.24 million kW, already reaching the prospect of
the year 2000. The output of nuclear power was 302 billion kWh in 19963. Because two plants
were commissioned in mid-1997, nuclear power produces 310 billion kWh when all plants run at
15
3 The data for 1997 is not available.
the utilization rate of 78%. Since the utilization rate was 80.2% on average in 1996 (JEA, 1996),
the output of nuclear power in 1997 reached the projection of the Outlook in the year 2000.
The reason why nuclear power will meet the Outlook's specifications is that all newly
commissioned plants were already under construction when the Outlook was prepared. Once actual
construction is begun, it is usually completed on schedule. The most difficult part of nuclear power
plant development is the pre-construction periods necessary to secure the consent for plant
development. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the projections of the year 2010 will be met.
In comparison, while nuclear power generation increased 30% from 1992 to 1995, ahead of
schedule, new energy increased 1% in the same time period. The Advisory Committee for Energy
(ACE), which prepared the Outlook, analyzed the aftermath of the Outlook and concluded that high
costs impeded the diffusion of new energies (ACE, 1996).
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Figure 2-2 "Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook" and Actual Recedes
New-energy policy has put the most weight on the development of and subsidies for new-
energy related technology. For instance, after the announcement the Global Rejuvenation Program,
the MITI revised "the Sunshine Project Program" for the first time in 16 years. The original
16
program had begun after the first oil crisis in order to develop energy technology. In 1993, the MITI
revised other national projects concerned with energy technology and started "the New Su"_hine
Project." The project promotes six main technologies; fuel cell, renewable energies, coal
liquefaction, super-conductivity, and hydrogen, and C02 fixation.
In December 1994, the government adopted the Basic Guidelines for New Energy Introduction,
the first basic guidelines ever drawn up by the government, to accelerate the introduction of new
energies. The Guidelines set up the targets for the introduction of new energies
Japan's Utilities
The Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) announced the Keidanren Voluntary
Action Plan on the Environment in November 1996. The action plan stated that:
Efforts will be made to reduce in 2010 the C02 emission per unit of output in the
electric power industry as a whole by about 20% as compared to the 1990 actual.
As a result, although the electric power output in 2010 is expected to increased 1.5
times over 1990, the amount of C02 emission will be kept down to an increase of
about 1.2 times (JFEO, 1997).
To achieve this goal, the FEPC proposed five measures: promoting nuclear power generation;
improving efficiency of energy use; adopting new energy; developing the technologies of C02
recovery and disposal; and supporting energy-saving.
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3. TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS
This chapter surveys the technology options for C02 control. It begins by discussing the
necessity of improving C02 intensity, considering the political environment surrounding the
utilities. Then, it surveys a technological scheme for improving C02 intensity that involves the
improvement of thermal efficiency, fuel switching, as well as others. The following two sections
investigate the costs and barriers of nuclear power plant development. They analyze why nuclear
power has cost-competitiveness in Japan and what difficulty nuclear power has despite its cost-
competitiveness. The last part creates a cost/risk matrix of technology options
3.1 IMPROVING C02 INTENSITY
There are number of technology options available to reduce C02 emissions by Japanese
utilities. Among them are demand side management (DSM), the improvement of C02 intensity,
and the offset of C02 emission. From the technological point of view, finding the least costly
options would reduce C02 emissions most economically. However, the reality of the political
environment requires the utilities to reduce C02 emissions from their power plants rather than
reducing them elsewhere. This section discusses the necessity of reducing C02 emissions from
power plants within the context of the political environment surrounding the utilities.
The net C02 emissions from the utilities can be described by the difference between C02
emissions from power plants and the offset to them somewhere outside power plants.
E = Q 0-
where
E = the net C02 emission [t-C]
Q = the electricity production [kWh]
rl = the C02 emission per unit electricity or C02 intensity of electricity [t-C/kWh]
O = the offset of C02 emission [t-C]
There are three options to reduce the net C02 emissions from utilities. First, demand side
management improves the efficiency of end use and reduces the demand of electricity, Q. Second,
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the improvement of C02 intensity, h, enhances the efficiency of power generation or switches fuels
from high-carbon fuels to such low-carbon fuels as nuclear power and natural gas. Third, the offset
is the reduction of C02 emissions from somewhere outside power stations. Joint implementations
and emissions permits trade offset the C02 emissions from power plants.
From the consumers' point of view, the reduction of electricity consumption is the outcome of
consumers' effort. Similarly emission trade and joint implementations are the outcome of other
sectors or other countries. Therefore, unless the utilities reduce their own emissions, the public will
look askance at the utilities: the utilities are seen to be shifting responsibility to others, enjoying the
fruits of their achievement.
Economically, the utilities share the cost of demand side management and the emissions offset
with their consumers. Nevertheless, the public still considers the utilities not a "free-rider" but not
a "driver" of C02 control: the utilities are just a "paid-rider." This makes no economic sense, but
the real problem is that the utilities lose the public trust. The public mistrust makes it more difficult
to resolve already existing barriers to siting power stations, particularly nuclear power stations and
radioactive-waste disposal repositories.
For these reasons, the following section focuses on the C02 emissions control from power
generation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the C02 intensity of Japan's utilities is 60% of that of the
U.S. The already low intensity raises the magical cost of improving it. From the technological
point of view, demand side management and the emission offset can reduce C02 emissions more
cost-effectively than the improvement of C02 intensity. Nevertheless, the problem facing Japan's
utilities is that the public may still ask the utilities to reduce their own emissions. For these reasons,
although demand side management and emission offset are important options for C02 control, they
are outside the scope of this thesis
3.2 TECHNOLOGICAL SCHEME FOR C02 CONTROL
As the concern over climate change increases, extensive numbers of technologies have been
studied and proposed to deal with this situation (Watson, et al ed., 1996). For power generation, a
collaborative effort between the United States Department of Energy and the electric utility
industry identified and proposed a number of technology options for greenhouse gas reduction
(DOE, 1994). Although there are a number of technology options, the point of them is to improve
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C02 intensity of electricity. There are three dependencies in improving C02 intensity: fuel choice,
the thermal efficiency of power generation, and power plant utilization rates.
Fuel Choice and Thermal Efficiency
Fuel choice and thermal efficiency are directly related to C02:
C
rl -=a
where
il = the C02 intensity of electricity [g-C/kWh]
C =- the carbon content of fuel [g-C/MJ-fuel]
X = the thermal efficiency of power generation [MJ-electric power/MJ-fuel]
a = a constant, 3.60 [MJ/kWh]
Fuel choice is the most influential factor for the improvement of C02 intensity. Included in
'carbon-free" power generation are nuclear power, hydroelectric power, solar power, wind power.
In addition to these, there is "carbon-neutral" power generation. For instance, biomass burning
power generation adds no C02 into the atmosphere as long as the same amount of biomass is
regenerated through afforestation, artificial cultivation, or natural growing. Municipal solid waste
mass is a mixture of biomass and fossil resources. Paper is an example of the former and plastics of
the latter. Therefore, it can add C02 into the atmosphere. Japan burns 72% of the its total
municipal sold waste due to the lack of landfill space (IEA, 1995). There are some 1,900
incineration plants; 6.8% of them produce electricity (ANRE, 1997). Because municipal solid
waste disposal emits C02 in either case, power generation in refuse incinerators increases no gross
C02 emissions. For this reason, municipal solid waste mass is reasonably eligible for carbon-
neutral fuel in Japan.
Improving thermal efficiency reduces fuel consumption and, consequently, C02 emission.
Japan has no significant natural resources of its own and the utilities have made efforts to ensure the
efficient utilization of energy sources. The government has tacitly approved of the utilities' use of
their monopolistic profits for energy research. As a result, the efficiency of power generation is
among the best in OEDC countries, as shown in Chapter 2.
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Figure 3-1 shows the relationship between C02 intensity and thermal efficiencies by fuel sort.
C02 intensities of carbon-free fuels and carbon-neutral fuels are always zero regardless of thermal
efficiency. C02 intensity decreases with the increase of thermal efficiencies. Efficiency gains of
50 - 60% could technologically be feasible. However, actual thermal efficiencies depend on load
factors. On one hand, power plants generate electricity most efficiently at the design load where
the efficiency is equal to the design value. On the other hand, the efficiency decreases below the
design value at the partial load. Table 3-1 shows the actual records of average thermal efficiencies
and average load factors. Due to the daily and seasonal fluctuation of demand, the load factor of
Japan's utilities is 55.3%. The low load factor reduces actual efficiencies below the design level.
For instance, the weighted average of thermal efficiencies at the Tokyo Electric Power
Company was 40.22%, while the actual efficiency was 39.04% in 1995. The gap of 1.18
percentage points is equivalent to 3% of the total output of the Company's thermal power plants.
Consequently, if the Company could operate its thermal power plants at design efficiency, 3% of
fossil fuels would be conserved, and there would be a 3% reduction of C02 emissions. In this
sense, demand side management can contribute to C02 control, leveling the demand and increasing
the actual thermal efficiency
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250/; 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55%
Thermal Efficiency, L-l
PC: Pulverized Coal-burning Power Plants
IGCC: Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle
ACC: Advanced Combined Cycle (1,300 C° )
CC: Combined Cycle (1,100C ° )
PFBC:Pressurized Fluid-bed Boiler Combined Cycle
FC: Fuel Cell
Figure 3-1 C02 Intensity
Table 3-1 Efficiency and Load Factor
transmission/
thermal efficiency distribution loss load factor
US 32.7% 5.4% 61.2%
UK 35.7% 9.4% 67.3%
Germany 39.8% 4.6% 69.3%
Canada 31.7% 8.0% 65.1%
France 34.4% 7.2% 66.2%
Itary 38.3% 6.7% 50.3%
Japan 38.9% 5.5% 55.0%
as of 1994
Source: JEA 1997
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Utilization Rate
C02 emission is obtained by multiplying C02 intensity and electricity production. Electricity
production, in turn, depends on the capacity and utilization rate of individual power plants. The
utilization rate is defined as the ratio of actual annual output to maximum annual output:
actual annual output [kWh/year]
utilization rate[-] --
capacity[kW] x 365[day/year] x 24[hr/day]
In Japan, utilization rates are 80.2 % for nuclear power, 71.6% for coal, 30.1% for oil, 54.7%
for natural gas, and 38.7% for hydroelectric power (ANRE, 1996b and JEA, 1996, 1997). Due to
their low running-costs, the utilization rates for nuclear power and coal are greater than those for oil
and natural gas. In particular, nuclear power plants run continuously except during routine
maintenance periods. Though law regulates the interval between routine maintenance, lengthening
the interval raises the utilization rate of nuclear power plants and reduces those of burning fossil
fuel.
Similarly, the relatively low utilization rate of natural gas results mainly from the capability to
follow a fluctuating demand. Natural gas burning power plants such as gas turbines run during the
daytime to satisfy peak demand and then reduce output at night. For this reason, leveling the
demand raises the utilization rate of natural gas burning power plants and reduces those of coal or
oil burning ones. In this case, raising the utilization rates of low-carbon fuel power plants reduce
C02 emissions.
Plant Capacity
C02 emissions depend on three factors: fuel choice, thermal efficiency, and utilization rates.
Form the viewpoint of power plant development three factors affect a plant's capacity for C02
control. That is, the plant capacities necessary for C02 control differ from fuel to fuel because of
the differences of three factors. For instance, the utilization rate of nuclear power is 80.2% while
that of solar power is less than 15% because solar power does not work at night (ERSJ, 1997).
Therefore, plant capacity equivalent to nuclear power is more than 5 times greater than that of
nuclear power.
Figure 3-2 shows plant capacities equivalent to nuclear power in terms of CO2 control. A
nuclear power plant of 1,350 MW produces electricity of 9460 GWh, running at the utilization of
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80%. When a new energy power plant is substituted for the nuclear power plant, the capacity is
9,000 MW for the utilization rate of 15% and 3,600 MW for that of 30%. Because of the low
utilization rate, the capacity of a new energy power plant is greater than that of a nuclear power
plant.
Similarly, when a LNG-buming thermal power plant is substituted for the nuclear power plant,
the capacity is 1,964 MW because the utilization of the LNG plant is 0.55. At the same time, the
LNG plant emits C02 of 918 kt-C. In order to offset the emissions, the utilities have to retrofit
existing thermal power plants or switch fuels. For instance, when utilities improve the efficiency of
coal burning thermal power plants from 38% to 43%, the capacity increases to 8,758 MW. In such
a case, the total capacity of the LNG plant and the coal plants is 10,722 MW. Similarly, when the
utilities switch the fuels of existing plants from coal to LNG, the total capacity is 3,554 MW.
All existing power plants are replaced at the end of their life. In such a case, the cost of the
replacements is not that of C02 abatement. However, when utilities replace plants before the end
of their natural life span in order to control C02, the utilities can not recover a portion of the
original cost. The stranded cost is included in the cost of C02 control. On the contrary, when the
utilities change the fuels being used in the plants to be built in the future, no stranded costs arise.
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Figure 3-2 Equivalent Capacity to C02 Control
3.3 COST OF NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION
When C02 emissions are stabilized at the 1990 level, the economic influence would reach from
0.5% to 2% of GDP in OECD countries4 (Bruce et al, 1996). MITI asserts that C02 control affects
Japan more seriously than other OECD countries (MITI, 1997). For this reason, cost-
competitiveness is the main concern of both the government and the utilities. Nuclear power is the
least-cost technology of power generation in resource-poor Japan. However, not only the price of
fossil fuels but also other factors contribute to the cost-competitiveness of nuclear power.
Cost of Power Generation
For Japanese power generation, nuclear power is a less-costly technology. Table 3-2
summarizes the costs of power generation in both Japan and the U.S. (ANRE, 1994 and Flavin,
1994). The cost of Japanese power generation is higher than in the U.S., but Japan's nuclear power
4 The economic loss of traffic accidents is estimated at 0.9% of GND in Japan.
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is considerably cheaper than in the U.S. Two facts can explain why nuclear power has cost-
competitiveness in Japan: the high costs of thermal power and the implicit preferential treatment
towards nuclear power.
Many things contribute to rise in the cost of thermal power generation, but the main reasons are
three-fold: First, Japan imports most fossil fuels, particularly natural gas imported as liquefied
natural gas. Second, sulfur premiums and pollution control regulations push up the cost of coal and
oil, requiring flue gas treatments, such as desulfuzation, denitration, and dust collection. Third,
energy taxes also raise the cost of fossil fuels. By contrast, the large part of the tax revenue is spent
con nuclear power plant development, creating an implicit subsidy for nuclear power.
Table 3-2 Costs of Power Generation in Japan and the US
Japan US
[yen/kWh] [cent/kWh] [cent/kWh]
Coal 10 8.3 5 -6
LNG 9 7.5 4 - 5
Nuclear 9 7.5 10 - 21
Wind 32 26.7 5 -7
exchage rate; 120[yen/dollar] Source: ANRE 1994
Flavin 1994
Costs of Air Pollution Control
In the past twenty years, Japan has doubled its GDP and increased the consumption of fossil
fuels by 41%. Nevertheless, sulfur oxide emissions decreased by 82% and nitrogen oxides
emissions decreased by 21% in the same period (OECD, 1994). Many industries contributed to the
success of pollution control including the utilities. Figure 3-1 shows the comparison of sulfur
oxides and nitrogen oxides emissions per unit electricity generated by thermal power plants (FEPC,
1995). Japan's utilities are the most successful in air pollution control among OECD countries.
Air pollution control raises the costs of thermal power generation. Table 3-3 shows the costs of
pollution control (Hasegawa, 1995). The costs of pollution control equipment account for 4.8 -
12.4% of the total cost of oil-burning power generation, and 18.2 % of that of coal burning power
generation. The costs of air pollution increase the cost of thermal power generation and enhance
the cost-competitiveness of nuclear power generation.
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Figure 3-3 SOx and NOx Emissions of Thermal Power Plants
Table 3-3 Thermal Power Generation and Pollution Abatement Cost
(Unit: yen/kWh, 1987)
'Fuel Heavy fuel oil Hevry fuel oil Coal
Sulfer content [%} 0.2 3.0 1.2
Power generation
Fuel cost 5.6 5.0 3.1
Fixed, operating costs 6.3 -6.3 7.7
Sub-total 11.9 11.3 10.8
Pollution abatement
Electrostatic precipitaion 0.1 0.1 0.2
Desulfurization 1.0 1.2
Denitration 0.2 0.2 0.4
Others 0.3 0.3 0.7
Sub-total 0.6 (4.8%) 1.6 (12.4%) 2.4 (18.2%)
Total 12.5 12.9 13.2
Source: Hasegawa 1995
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Tax on Fossil Fuels and Power Generation
Japan levies taxes on fossil fuel consumption and power generation (Figure 3-4). National
taxes involve a tariff, an oil tax, and a tax on power generation. The tariff is 315 yen per kt, but will
be abolished by 2002. An oil tax was enacted in 1978 to supplement the fiscal resources of oil
store. The rate was 2,040 yen per ke for oil, and 720 yen per t for natural gas. The tariff and the tax
account for around 15% of the cost of oil and 3% of that of liquefied natural gas5 .
A tax on power generation was enacted in 1974 after the first oil crisis in order to promote
power development. After the second oil crisis, tax revenue also has been spent on the
diversification of power sources. The tax rate is 445 yen per thousand kWh and accounts for 2.3%
of the price of electricity. The revenue is spent on power development at 160 yen, and on the
diversification at 285 yen of 445 yen. Although nuclear power is subject to the tax as well, a large
part of the tax revenue is spent in siting new nuclear power plants. For instance, while the subsidy
is usually spent on the regions where power plants are located, the government can subsidize a
region where the utilities carry out environmental assessment for nuclear power plant development
even before the development is officially approved by the government (JEA, 1996). The tax is an
implicit subsidy for nuclear power.
The existing tax on fossil fuel can be translated C02-emission equivalent rate. Therefore, the
tax can be considered an implicit carbon tax. Table 3-4 shows an implicit carbon tax (Hoeller,
1991). The implicit carbon tax in Japan is 2.8 times higher that in the U.S. The tax revenue from
fossil fuel was 3.7 trillion yen in 1993 accounting for 5.7% of the total national tax revenue and
20.8% of the total revenue from indirect taxes (Ishi, 1995). Assuming the price elasticity of fossil
fuel is equal to 0.2, an implicit carbon tax is estimated to already mitigate C02 emissions by 19.3
million t-C, or 5% of the total C02 emissions from Japan (ERI, 1997).
In addition, air and water pollution from radioactive materials is not subject to the Basic
Environment Law. The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage confines the accident
compensation of utilities within 30 billion yen (250 million dollars). The law prescribes that the
national government compensate for damage in excess of 30 billion yen. These preferential
treatments also contribute to the cost-competitiveness of nuclear power.
5 It is assumed that the price of oil and liquefied natural gas are 18.3 [$/barrel], 180 [$/t] respectively and that the
exchange rate is 120 [yen/$].
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Table 3-4 Implicit Carbon Tax (Unit; US dollars)
implicit carbon tax US Japan Germany France Italy UK Canada
oil 65 130 212 351 317 297 108
natural gas 0 2 23 38 80 0 0
coal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 28 79 95 229 223 106 52
exchange rate 1.0 128 1.8 6.0 1,302 0.6 1.2
Source: Hoeller 1991
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Figure 3-4 Energy Taxes of Japan
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3.4 BARRIERS TO NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT
For C02 control technologies, cost-effectiveness is an essential guideline for technology
choice. However, technological costing, which develops estimations focusing on direct
expenditures to implement control technologies, frequently gives much too optimistic results,
ignoring social and political barriers. For practical technology choice, the viability of control
technologies should be considered. This section explores barriers to nuclear power development.
Timetable of CO2 Control
The COP3 set up a timetable as well as national targets for C02 emissions control. C02
emissions controls have to be implemented within an established timetable. Article 3 of the Kyoto
protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) states:
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse
gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, ... in the
commitment period 2008 to 2012 (FCCC, 1998).
Japan and other economically advanced countries set up targets timetable at the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change held in Rio in 1992. This convention stipulated that
economically advanced countries try to reduce C02 emissions to the level of 1990 by the end of
1990s. The targets and timetable, however, are not legally binding to the signatories.
By contrast, the agreement of the COP3 is legally binding to the signatories. Penalties of non-
compliance will be made soon. In addition, the COP3 established more difficult targets than the
FCCC. For Japan, the former is to reduce greenhouse emissions to 6% below 1990 levels, while
the latter is to stabilize C02 emissions per capita at 1990 level. MITI maintains that C02
emissions can not be reduced below 1990 levels and that the reduction of 6% should be achieved
through emissions permits trade, a clean development mechanism, and forestation (Fujime, 1998).
Nuclear Power
Although nuclear power usage has increased steadily, the Advisory Committee for Energy,
which prepared the outlook as an advisory committee for the minister of MITI, expressed concern
over the difficulty of further nuclear power plant development (ACE, 1996). The most difficult
part of nuclear power plant development is to identify the site and to secure the consent of the local
residents and the local government. A series of scandalous incidents at "Monju" in December 1995
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and a "reprocessing facility" in March 1997, run by the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation, augmented abiding distrust of nuclear power among a large public.
In August 1996, residents voted directly on whether or not they should sell town land to a
utility for the purpose of building a nuclear power station. This was the first inhabitants' poll for a
nuclear power station in Japan. The construction of the station was rejected by a vote of 61% to
39%. Although the voting had no legal force in prohibiting the construction of the power station,
the utility altered the plant building schedule which had been delayed 17 times for the past 18 years
(Nigata Nippo 1996).
Although the utilities make every effort to develop nuclear power plants, the difficulty in siting
new plants makes the lead-time long and volatile. As discussed in the next chapter, the lead-time is
reaching 25 years in Japan. There are a number of reasons for this difficulty in siting nuclear power
plants. Among them, two facts can be pointed out. First, most nuclear power plants are located
outside the service area of the utility and supply no electricity to the areas where the plants are
located. For instance, while Japan consists of 47 prefectures or administrative divisions, they
sometimes are called "electricity- export prefectures," and "electricity-import prefectures." In
Tokyo, where more than 30% of the total electricity of Japan is consumed, 94% of total
consumption is "imported" from other prefectures. Because nuclear power plants often supply no
electricity to the regions where they are located, they are frequently for the residents nothing but
unwanted facilities. The typical argument against nuclear power plants is that they should be sited
in the areas that need them.
Second, Japan has not yet decided on a policy for radioactive waste disposal. Indeed, Japan has
not yet decided who is responsible for radioactive waste disposal: the utilities or the national
government. Residents are afraid that not only nuclear power plants but also permanent or interim
repositories for nuclear waste will be sited in their regions.
These two barriers are difficult to resolve. The concern over the safety of nuclear power plants
can be mediated by the utilities accumulating a strong safety record and establishing trust with the
residents. However, from the standpoint of the residents, to prove safety has little to do with the
necessity for nuclear power plants. Similarly, the importance of energy security is not a persuasive
reason why nuclear power plants should be sited outside of the consuming areas of the generated
electricity. Although the government and utilities procrastinate on nuclear waste disposal, it will
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become a concrete problem sooner or later. In this sense, the concern of the residents is quite
reasonable.
In short, because the barriers are not technological or economic, the problem of nuclear plant
development is extremely difficult to resolve. Therefore, despite the increasing necessity for
nuclear power plants in terms of energy supply and C02 emissions control, nuclear power plant
development has a tendency to be problematic.
3.5 MAPPING CONTROL TECH'NOLOGIES
Low-cost and high-uncertainty options have cost-competitiveness but, on the other hand,
difficulty in the implementation within a specific time period. Nuclear power is involved in this
equation. Liquefied natural gas may come into this equation because Japan is required to import
most natural gas and which in turn requires the development of overseas gas fields, transportation
system infrastructures, and long-term contracts with exporting countries. In addition, some experts
are concerned that the rapid expansion of China's and India's consumption may cause a shortage of
LNG supply in the Asian region (Morita, 1998). As discussed in the following section, the cost of
natural-gas burning power generation is cheaper than that of oil and coal in Japan while natural gas
is the most expensive fuel in the U.S. Therefore, switching fuel from oil and coal to natural gas
would reduce C02 emissions, bringing a net benefit. In other words, the utilities could reduce C02
emissions free of cost. That, however, produces the same paradox as nuclear power. If natural gas
usage was without difficulty, the utilities should have expanded its use already. It is reasonable that
natural gas has some difficulties in expansion and, consequently, comes into the segment of low-
cost and some uncertainty.
The ideal option is low-cost and low-uncertainty technologies. Conventional energy
conversation technologies can be involved in this segment. However, the paradox is similar to that
of nuclear power. If technologies had cost-competitiveness and no difficulty in the diffusion, they
should have diffused throughout markets already. For instance, there is a long-standing
controversy over fluorescent lights (Wallich, 1994). Although fluorescent lighting is more energy-
efficient than conventional light bulbs, they have not diffused rapidly into markets due to the higher
initial cost. While there are some explanations for consumer behavior (Sanstad, 1995), it is safe to
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say that technologies, which have not already diffused into the market, have some difficulties
preventing this diffusion.
Technologies, which have not yet been feasible practically or economically, are high-cost and
high-uncertainty options. Next generation, innovative technologies fall in this segment. Table 3-5
and Table 3-6 lists renewable energy technologies (Dornbusch, 1991) and the cots of them (TEPCO
1997, ANRE, 1997, IERJ 1997 and Flavin, 1994). Future supplies are involved in these segments.
The bottom line of technology mapping is that, from the economic point of view, any
technologies, which have not already diffused into the marketplace, have some difficulties in
diffusion and implementation. The difficulties are not always the cost of technology but may
include other sorts of barriers such as public acceptance of nuclear power, liquefied natural gas
infrastructures, and consumer preferences in energy-conservation investments.
When there is a tradeoff between cost-effectiveness and risk in uncertainty, choosing the
appropriate combination of control technologies could adjust the balance between cost-
effectiveness and risk. In other words, uncertainty over implementation is an important constraint
on technology choice. When the timetable is given high priority, high-cost and low-uncertainty
technologies could be feasible. From this point of view, Chapter 4 rethinks Japan's utilities'
technology choice for C02 emissions control.
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Uncertainty of the Implementation
Figure 3-5 Conceptual Mapping C02 Control Technologies
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Table 3-5 Renewable Energy Potential
Proven capability' Transition phaseb Future supplies'
Hydo power Wind Advanced wind
Geothermal Solar thermal Advanced solar thermal
Hydrothermal Ethanol (corn) Transportation fuel from energy crops
High-temperature electric Active solar in buildings Ocean thermal
Low-temperature heat Geothermal Advanced geothermal
Biomass lydrothermal I-lot dry rock
Direct combustion Moderate-temperature lectric Geopressure
Gasification Remote photo voltaic Magma
Passive solar in buildings Grid-connected photo voltaic
Small, remote photo voltaic Wave
Tidal
a: Mature technologies.
b: Has or is entering market as technology develops, often preferential tax or rate considerations.
c: Advanced technoogis that show potential. source: Dornbush 1991
Table 3-6 Costs of New Energy Power Generation
Japan US
[yen/kWh] [cent/kWh]* [yen/kWh]* [cent/kWh]
Solar Power 70 - 120 84 - 144 48 - 84 57 - 101
Solar Thermal n.a. 7 - 23 8 - 27
Wind Power 24 - 46 29 - 55 4 - 8 5 - 9
Geothermal 13 -16 16 -19 3-9 4- 11
Wave 31 - 43 26 - 52 7-8 8-9
Municipal Solid Waste 7 - 13 8 - 16 n.a.
Biomass n.a. n.a.
* Exchange rate 120[yen/$]
Source; TEPCO 1997, ANRE 1997, IERJ 1997, Dornbusch 1991, Flavin 1994
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4. TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
This chapter discusses technology choice. It begins by defining the objective function of
technology choice, and then it estimates the risk of nuclear power plant development in terms of
C02 control within a specific time horizon. Next, it proposes the strategies for reducing the risk.
And, finally, it develops a framework to incorporate uncertainty into technology choice and
demonstrates the risk-cost tradeoff of technology choice.
4.1 OBJECTIVE FUNCTION OF TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
Cost-effectiveness is a prerequisite of C02 control technology. At the same time, C02 control
has to be implemented within the time limit set up in the COP3. Therefore, technology choice can
be described as:
Minimize: Costs of Control
Subject to: Quantity of C02 and Limit on Time
The essential point of this definition is that the cost-minimum choice is not always the optimal
choice when a time limit is imposed. Technologies whose costs are low but that are not guaranteed
the unfailing implementations, are a risky choice. By way of contrast, technologies whose costs are
high but have a guaranteed implementation within a time limit, can be a reasonable choice.
Essentially, there is a trade-off between cost-effectiveness and viability of technology options. It is
this dilemma that nuclear power is now facing.
As discussed in Chapter 2, nuclear power is facing difficulty in siting plants. The difficulty
makes the lead-time of nuclear power plant development long and volatile. The long and volatile
lead-time could be because of uncertainty over the implementation of C02 controls within a
specific time period. The following sections explore the lead-time of nuclear power development
and develop a framework to incorporate uncertainty into technology choice.
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4.2 LEAD-TIME FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DEVELOPMENT
For C02 control, the problems of the lead-time are two-fold:
* When the lead-time turns out to be longer than a given time period, nuclear power can not
contribute to C02 control or to compliance with the agreement of the COP3.
* The volatility of the lead-time makes the implementation of C02 control uncertain.
The two problems are similar, but not identical. The latter means that, even when the average
of the lead-time is shorter than the time limit, the utilities still bear the risk that they can not control
C02 emissions within a given time period.
Lengthenin Lead-times
Figure 4-1 outlines the procedures of nuclear power plant development. The procedure consists
of three phases: finding a site for a power station and the examination of the Electric Power
Development Coordination Council (EPDCC); the issuance of construction permits; and actual
construction of a power station. The EPDCC examines the necessity of power plant development
in terms of electricity supply and approves the plan of power plant developmncit. The Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) and the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) then examines the safety of
nuclear power reactors and issue the construction permits. Figure 4-2 itemizes the lead-time for
nuclear power plant development (MITI 1995 and Suetugu 1994). In the 1970's, the average leadr
time was 8.3 years and rose to 17.4 years in the 1980's, and is approaching 25.7 years in the 1990's.
The lengthiest portion of the lead-time is devoted to finding sites for new power stations. The
period of 16 years accounts for 63% of the overall lead-time. There are three main reasons behind
the difficulty in finding sites. First, the utilities have to secure the consent of the residents and the
local governments to carry out an environmental impact assessment. Particularly, it requires the
consent of more than half of the fishery cooperatives that will lose their fishery rights. Second,
when the assessment is carried out and the results are approved by the national government, the
utilities have to purchase a lot for a power station as well as gain fishery rights. Finding a site is
often bogged down in the concession of fishery rights. Conceding fishery rights to the utilities
requires the consent of more than two-thirds of the fishery cooperatives. Finally, when fishery
rights are conceded, the utilities have to secure the consent of a prefecture governor. Until the
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residents and the local governments give their consent to build a nuclear power station, the utilities
can not present a plan for nuclear power plant development to the EPDCC.
Once the utilities gain the necessary consent, the utilities propose a power station development
plan to the EPDCC. The EPDCC then examines the necessity of power plants in terms of
electricity supply. When the EPDCC approves the plan, the MITI, the AEC, and the NSC examine
the safety of nuclear power reactors. The AEC and the NSC, which are established by the Atomic
Energy Basic Law, issue construction permits with the consent of the Prime Minister. The period
from the EPDCC's examination to the issuance of construction permits is normally three years.
When construction permits are issued, the utilities begin to construct a power station. It usually
takes about five years to construct a power station.
When the utilities build additional nuclear power plants in an existing power station, it is
neither necessary to purchase lots for power plants nor gain fishery rights 6. In this case, the lead-
time is shorter than that necessary to build new power stations. The leading utility of Japan, the
Tokyo Electric Power Company, operates 17 nuclear power plants in 3 nuclear power stations, and
their nuclear power stations have 6 plants on average. These plants are built in sequence in
response to the increase in electricity demand. The lead-time to construct the first plant is longer
than those of the second and subsequent plants.
According to past statistics, if the utilities plan to build a nuclear power station today, the first
plant will be commissioned 25.7 years later or in the year 2023. The agreement of the COP3
stipulates that C02 emission should be reduced by 2008 or 2012. To do so, the utilities have to
devote unusual effort to shorten the lead-time of nuclear power plant development.
6 Usually, the utilities pay additional compensation to fishery cooperatives because of the increased sea areas that may
be affected by the power station.
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Volatility of Lead-time
The large part of the lead-time is to find sites for power stations. If the utilities have already
purchased lots for power stations and fishery rights or if they build additional plants in the existing
power stations, the average lead-time is about 8 years. Consequently, the plants commissioned
today are expected to go into operation 8 years later or in the year 2006. However, not all plants are
guaranteed operability within 8 years due to the volatility of the lead-time.
Such volatility is because the consent of the residents and the local government dose not always
mean the consent of proprietors of building lots. For instance, the Tohoku Electric Power
Company announced the plan of the Maki nuclear power station in 1971. A perceptual governor
gave consent to the plan and the EPDCC approved the plan in 1981. Nevertheless, the utility has
yet to purchase a part of the lot for the power station. The area is 1,700 m2 (0.42 acres), or less than
0.1% of the total area of the power station (Suetugu, 1994).
Figure 4-3 shows the distribution of lead-times from the issuance of permits to commissioning
plants (JAE, 1996). No data about the distribution of the entire lead-time are available. The lead-
41
__·
time from the issuance of permits to commissioning plants is a lognormal distribution, where a
logarithm of the lead-time is normally distributed:
I (1n(x)-p)
F(t)= | -e 2 d
r27 x
where
F(t) = the probability distribution function [-]
t = the lead-time [years]
a = the standard deviation of logarithms of the lead-time
p = the average of logarithms of the lead-time
The probability distribution function, "F(t)," describes the probability that the lead-time is from
0 to t years. The average of logarithms of the lead-time, "p", is 2.02, that is equal to 7.6 years. The
standard deviation, "a", is 0.27. The past statistics indicates that half of 53 plants were
commissioned within 7.6 years from the EPDCC's approval while 5% of them were commissioned
more than 11.7 years later from the EPDCC's approval.
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4.3 ANALYZING RISKS OF LONG LEAD-TIME
The risk of nuclear power is that the utilities fail to commission newly built plants within a
given time period. This section estimates the risk in such action. The risk depends on many things,
but 3 factors predominate. First, the time limit directly affects the risk. When the time limit is long
enough to build nuclear power plants, the utilities can ignore the risk.
Second, the risk depends on the status of ongoing projects. When the utilities have already
purchased fishery rights and lots for new power stations or decide to build new plants in existing
power stations, the plants could be built within a relatively short time period, which reduces the
risk. By contrast, it would take a long time to commission the plants if the utilities building new
power stations have not yet received the consent of the residents and the local government. In this
case, the risk increases.
Third, the more plants necessary for C02 control, the lower the probability of all plants going
into operation within the time limit. In other words, when the utilities increase the number of plants
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to be built, the probability that some of them are not commissioned within a given time period
increases. Let a project probability, "F," denote the individual probability of a plant being
commissioned within a given time period. Similarly, let a system probability, "P," denote the
overall probability that all plants necessary for C02 control are commissioned. For instance, when
each plant has a project probability of 0.5 and two plants are necessary for C02 control, a system
probability can be obtained by the production of project probabilities: P = F x F = 0.5 x 0.5 = 0.25.
A system probability depends on both the project probability of each plant and the number of
necessary plants.
Time Limit
As discussed in Chapter 1, the COP3 set up the time table for C02 control. Japan and other
developed countries have to reduce C02 emissions in the period 2008 to 2012. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the utilities reduce C02 emission in the year 2012. To do so, the utilities have to build
nuclear power plants before the year 2012. The time limit for building plants is the year 2011 and
there are 13 years before the time limit. The time limit of 13 years is shorter than the entire lead-
time from finding sites to constructing plants (25.7 years), while it is longer than the lead-time for
the issuance of construction permits and actual construction (7.6 years). Thus, a critical issue is
how many projects have already received the consent of the residents and the local governments.
Ongoing Projects
In 1997, while 5 nuclear power plants were closed down in the world, 2 plants were
commissioned in Japan. As a result, Japan operates 53 plants7 whose total capacity is 45.248
million kW. That accounts for 12% of the total number and the total capacity of the world (JAIF,
1998).
Table 4-1 lists ongoing projects of nuclear power plant development. As of 1998, one plant is
under construction and 4 plants have been approved by the EPDCC and are waiting for construction
permits to be issued from the national government. In addition, the EPDCC is examining another 5
projects. A total of 10 plants have already received the consent of the residents and the local
government. In addition to these ten plants, the utilities have announced plans to build another 10
plants, which have not yet received the consent of residents and local governments. Therefore,
7 The Japan Atomic Power Company decommissioned on March 31, 1998 a reactor built in 1966, which was the first
reactor built in Japan.
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there are 20 ongoing nuclear power plant projects, which matches the prospect that the MITI
expects to build by 2010.
However, there is clear nationwide uncertainty about ongoing projects. For instance, as shown
in Chapter 2, the inhabitant's poll blocked the project of the Maki nuclear power station. In
addition, the recent scandalous incidents of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development
Corporation deeply eroded the public trust in nuclear power policy and technology.
Therefore, the utilities have reservations about the future of ongoing projects. An expert of the
utilities said: "11 of 20 plants are the best we can do." (Asahi Shinbun, 1998). The view of the
experts roughly matches the number of projects that have already received consent.
Table 4-1 Ongoing Projects of Nuclear Power Development
Utility Unit Capacity Planned
[MW] Commission
Under constraction
1 Tohoku Onagawa #3 825 Jan-2002
Issuing Permits
* 2 Tohoku Higashidori #1 1,100 Jul-2005
* 3 Tohoku Maki #1 825 **
4 Chubu Hamaoka #5 1,380 Aug-2005
5 Hokuriku Shika #2 1,358 Mar-2006
EPDCC examination
6 Tokyo Fukushima Daiich #7 1,380 2005
7 Tokyo Fukushima Daiich #8 1,380 2006
* 8 Chugoku Kaminoseki #1 1,373 2007
* 9 Chugoku Kaminoseki #2 1,373 2010
* 10 EPDC Oma #1 1,383 2006
Planned
11 Tokyo Higashidori #1 1,100 2004
12 Tokyo Higashidori #2 1,100 2005
* 13 Chubu Ashihama #1 1,350 2004
* 14 Chubu Ashihama #2 1,350 2004
* 15 Tohoku Namie.Odaka #1 1,100 2004
16 Tohoku Higashidori #2 1,100 2005
17 JAPC Turuga #3 n.a. n.a.
18 JAPC Turuga #4 n.a. n.a.
19 Chugoku Shimane #2 n.a. n.a.
* 20 Kyushu Kushima n.a. n.a.
* New Sits EPDC; Electric Power Development Co., Ltd.
** See Chapter 2 JAPC; Japan Atomic Power Company
Source; Suetsugu 1994, JEA 1997, STA 1998
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Model Scenario
For simplicity, this thesis assumes the following scenario: first, the utilities build 20 nuclear
power plants by 2011 to control C02 emissions (this is the same scenario as the long-term energy
supply and demand outlook prepared by the Advisory Committee for Energy); second, to do so, the
utilities build two plants each year from 2002 to 2011 (because the next plant is expected to go into
operation in 2002, no plant is commissioned before 2002); third, no nuclear power plant is closed
down until 20128. As a result, 73 nuclear power plants will be running in 2012. Figure 44 shows
the past development of nuclear power plants, the ongoing projects listed in Table 4-1, and the
scenario assumed here.
This scenario assumes that the capacity of a nuclear power plant is 1,350 MW and the
utilization rate is 80% so that the annual output is 9,460 GWh. Assuming that, existing plants and
20 newly built plants will supply the electricity that the long-term supply and demand outlook
expects.
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8 The Japan Atomic Power Company decommissioned on March 31, 1998 a reactor built in 1966, which was the first
reactor built in Japan.
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Over the past 32 years, Japan built 53 nuclear power plants. The average rate of building plants
is 1.65 plants per a year. The building rate of two plants per year is higher than the past average.
As discussed in Chapter 2, building nuclear power plants is getting tougher and tougher. Even if
the utilities dedicate their best efforts, building 2 plants each year will be a daunting challenge for
them.
Estimating Risk
The scenario is a "plan," however. The implementation of the plan would be affected by the
volatility of the lead-time, and the system probability of the plan depends on project probabilities of
the scenario.
First, the lead-time of plants approved by the EPDCC is lognomaly distributed. Project
probabilities of them can be estimated from a probability distribution function. For instance, plants
approved in 1997 have 14 years before 2012. A project probability for them is estimated as:
~14 1 1 (In(x)-2.02)'
F(14) = 0 .6 1 -* - - e 2x02662 dx = 0.9898
° 0.2661 x
In this case, the utilities can reasonably ignore the risk of failing to commission the plants
because the probability is almost 1. For this reason, while five plants have already been approved
by the EPDCC, four of them are reasonably expected to go into operation not later than 2011. The
one exception is the Maki nuclear power station, which was discussed above.
In addition, the EPDCC are examining five plants now and are expected to approve them
within 1 or 2 years. Thus, they also can be expected to go into operation before 20119. In all, 9
plants are assumed to be commissioned not later than 2011.
Assuming that 9 plants are commissioned, the system probability of the scenario is equal to the
probability that the rest of the 11 plants go into operation not later than 2011. In other words, the
variability of C02 control depends on project probabilities of the 11 plants. Building 11 plants is
clearly a serious challenge to the utilities. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the probability of 11
plants going into operation before 2011. First, a series of recent scandals and a poll of the
inhabitants make the future of nuclear power unpredictable. Second, the current situation of each
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project is not disclosed. Some projects may be close to receiving the consent of the residents and
the local governments, while others may have just began the process. Third, no information is
available on the distribution of the lead-time before the EPDCC's examination. The only available
data are the averages of the lead-time as shown in Figure 4-3.
On the contrary, although it is difficult to accurately estimate project probabilities of actual
plants, it is possible to calculate back to the necessary condition for C02 control. For instance,
when a plant is commissioned with a project probability of 0.9, a system probability of two plants
being commissioned is obtained from the production of the project probabilities: 0.9x0.9=0.81.
Conversely, when a system probability of two plants is 0.81, a project probability of each plant is
obtained from the inverse operation: 0.81 '/2=0.9. In that case, when the utilities ensure C02 control
with a probability of 0.81, each plant needs to be built with a probability of 0.9.
Generally, when a system probability is given, project probabilities can be obtained from the
inverse function of the system probability. In reality the utilities build not just one plant but
sometimes more than two plants in a project. Therefore, a system probability depends on not the
number of plants to be built but the number of projects to be launched:
P=F, xF2 x- xFn
where
P = the system probability that "n" projects commissioning plants not later than 2011.
Fi = the project probability of an "i-th" project commissioning plants not later than 2011
The number of independent projects depends on how many plants the utilities build in a project.
The plants of the same project have the same lead-time because they simultaneously fall behind
schedule due to the same difficulties, such as the purchase of a lot for a power station. Previous
projects built one or two plants at a time. When each project builds one plant, 11 projects are
necessary to build 11 plants. When each project builds two plants, 6 projects are necessary-5
projects build two plants and one project builds one plant. In the model scenario, the total number
of projects is no more than 11 and no less than 6.
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9 In March 31 1998, the EDPC revised the schedule of the Oma nuclear power station due to the delay of the consent of
fishery cooperatives. (Asahi Shinbun April 1 1998)
Cleariy, different projects have different probabilities. For simplicity, n projects are assumed
to have an identical probability. In that case, a project probability is obtained from the 1/n-th root
of a system probability. For instance, when the utilities launch 6 projects and they ensure C02
control with a system probability of 0.80, the necessary condition of each project is obtained from
the one sixth root of 0.80; 0.80"6-0.96. In that case, 6 projects need to have a project probability of
not less than 0.96.
Figure 4-5 shows the necessary conditions of four cases-system probabilities are equal to
0.90, 0.80, 0.70, and 0.60. It is not the intention of this thesis to discuss what system probability is
enough to ensure C02 control. However, even when a "fifty-fifty chance" is enough for C02
control, each project still needs to have a project probability of 0.94 for 11 projects, 0.89 for 6
projects. Generally, it is safe to say that a "fifty-fifty chance" is not high enough to comply with
the agreement of the COP3. Nevertheless, the way things stand now, a project probability of 0.94
or 0.89 may not be realistic. Indeed, if each project had a project probability of 0.90, the utilities
industry would not mention a concern about the future of nuclear power plant development.
Moreover, what matters most is that a system probability is always less than the smallest
project-probability among all projects. For instance, when all projects have a project probability of
1.0 but only one project has that of 0.5, a system probability decreases to 0.5. In other words, the
overall risk strongly depends on the most risky project. Thus, even when the risks of most projects
are negligible, but one project is risky, reducing the risk is "a must" for C02 control.
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4.4 REDUCING RISK
The analysis of a system probability shows that nuclear power is a risky option as long as
uncertainty attaches to the lead-time. That, however, does not diminish the necessity of nuclear
power plant development. On the contrary, the more risky nuclear power plant development is, the
more concentrated effort the utilities need to make up for that risk.
At the same time, when risk is not negligible, reducing the risk is indispensable in ensuring
C02 control. Foe this purpose, the following sections discusses strategies for reducing the risk of
technology choice. The basic strategies are to set up technology portfolios that combine nuclear
power and low-risk technologies.
Strategies for Reducing Risk
Nuclear power has the long and volatile lead-time that makes C02 control uncertainty. In
contrast, energy sources such as wind power have less difficulty in siting plants and, therefore,
more predictable lead-time than nuclear power. For this reason, combining these two technology
options can reduce the risk of failing C02 control. The following part of this section discusses the
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combinations of nuclear power and new energy power, or "technology portfolios", in terms of the
risk reduction.
Though the development of new energy power plants does have some difficulties' ° , for
simplicity we will assume that they can be built anytime the utilities want. To ensure C02 control,
the utilities are assumed to combine nuclear power plants and new energy power plants. The
possible combinations are:
a) building more than 20 nuclear power plants
b) substituting some new energy power plants for a part of 20 nuclear power plants
c) building some new energy power plants and 20 nuclear power plants
d) building another combination of new energy power plants and nuclear power plants
a) Building More Than 20 Nuclear Power Plants
The first strategy is just to launch additional projects of nuclear power. For instance, when the
utilities launch additional projects to build total 21 nuclear power plants, the system probability of
all 21 plants being commissioned is less than that of 20 plants. However, a system probability of at
least 20 plants being commissioned is higher than that of 20 plants. In other words, even when the
utilities fail to commission one plant, they have still a chance to commission 20 plants. In this
sense, additional plants can be seen as a type of insurance.
This argument, however, holds good when all projects are independent each other. For
instance, when a movement against nuclear power plants in a certain region affects other projects in
other regions, project probabilities of each project are no longer independent. Similarly, when the
utilities build plants in a power station one by one, the latter plants can not be built until the former
plants are built. Likewise, when the utilities build plants in different power stations but have to
secure the consent of the same local government, it is often difficult to receive the consent of the
latter projects until the local government gives the consent of the first projects. In those cases,
launching additional projects does not enhance a system probability.
x The municipal-waste-burning power generation has the some similar difficulty in siting power plants as nuclear
power does.
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In addition, the utilities are reasonably assumed to launch "easy" projects first and "tough"
ones later. This is because the lead-time of tough projects is longer than those of easy ones and,
consequently, the costs of the former are higher than those of the latter. To minimize the cost of
power development, the utilities build plants in order of increasing difficulty. For this reason,
additional projects are always more risky than ongoing projects and project probabilities of the
former are always lower than those of the most risky ongoing projects. Therefore, although
launching additional projects enhances the system probability, the contribution may not be large.
b) Substituting New Energy Power for Nuclear Power
By contrast, building new energy power plants always increases a system probability and
decreases the risk of failing to commission 20 plants because of the predictable lead-time. For
instance, when the utilities build a new energy power plant and 19 nuclear power plants, a system
probability is equal to that of 19 nuclear power plants being commissioned because a new energy
power has a project probability of 1.O. The substitution of new energy power plants for nuclear
power plants simply reduces the risk of nuclear power projects and enhances the system
probability.
c) Building Additional New Energy Power Plants
When the utilities build new energy power plants in addition to 20 nuclear power plants, that
reduces the necessary number of nuclear power plants to control C02. For instance, when the
utilities build one new energy power plant and 20 nuclear power plants, 19 nuclear power plants are
enough to control C02. In that case, a system probability is equal to that of at least 19 nuclear
power plants being commissioned. In other words, the utilities can fail t commission one of
twenty plants. Reducing the necessary number of nuclear power plants enhances the system
probability.
d) Combining New Energy and Nuclear Power
Strategy (d) involves any possible combination of nuclear power plants and new energy power
plants. The common strategy of technology portfolios is to reduce the ratio of the necessary
number to the total number of nuclear power plants. For Instance, when the utilities build 2 new
energy power plants and 19 nuclear power plants, a system probability is equal to that of at least 18
of 19 nuclear power plants being commissioned.
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ReducinL Risk
As shown in Section 4.3, the system probability of C02 control depends on the number of
projects. Thus, the following part of this section analyzes a system probability based on the number
of projects. As discussed in Section 4.3, the total number of projects is from 6 to 11, depending on
the average number of plants involved in a project.
For instance, when 6 nuclear power projects are necessary for C02 control and 6 projects have
the same probability of 0.90, a system probability of all six projects being commissioned is 0.53:
P(=F 6 =0.96 = 05314
where
P(-N) = the system probability that "n" of "N"' projects going into operation
N!
N C - the number of combinations of "n" pulled from "N."n!- (N - n)!
F = the project probability of a project going into operation
A system probability of 0.53 is almost a "fifty-fifty" chance. On the other hand, an additional
project of new energy power decreases nuclear power projects necessary for C02 control from 6
projects to 5 projects. In that case, a system probability of at least 5 nuclear power projects being
commissioned is obtained from the sum of the probability of 5 projects being commissioned and
that of 6 projects:
P(6)=6C5 Fs (1- F)' = 7 x 0.95 x (1-0.9)' = 0.3543
. p )=p () +P( =03542 + 05314 = 0.8857
An additional project of new energy power enhances a system probability from 0.53 to 0.89.
This is an example of Strategy (c).
In general, when each nuclear power project has a project probability of "F," a system
probability of "P"' is obtained from:
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P(=,Cn*F(1- n
P N)=NC.F F. (1F)Nn
where
L = the number of projects necessary for C02 control
M = the number of new energy power projects
N = the number of nuclear power projects
Table 4-2 Strategies for Reducing Risk
Strategy New energy power plants Nuclear power plants
M N
a) M=O N>L
b) M+N=L
c) M>O N=L
d) M+N>L
L; the number of projects necessary for C02 control
Table 4-2 summarizes the strategies and Table 4-3 - Table 4-5 shows the results of the risk
reductions. Table 4-3 is the same case discussed above. Six nuclear power projects are necessary
for C02 control and a project probability of each project is 0.9. Table 4-4 is the case where project
probabilities of nuclear power projects are 0.6. Table 4-5 is the case where 11 nuclear power
projects have a project probability of 0.9. Table 4-4 shows that a system probability is diminished
to less than 0.047 when 6 nuclear power projects have a project probability of 0.6 and the utilities
launch no new energy projects. In contrast, an additional new energy project increases it from
0.047 to 0.233 by 5 times.
Figure 4-6 shows the results of enhancing system probabilities. First, no matter what projects
are added, adding projects enhances system probabilities more effectively than substituting new
energy power projects for nuclear power projects. Therefore, it is not advisable to drop ongoing
nuclear power projects even when they have a small project probability, say 0.6. Indeed, sooner or
later, ongoing projects become necessary to satisfy ever-increasing demand. Unless the utilities
begin actual construction of power plants, the cost of pursuing ongoing projects is nominal
compared with the total cost of power plant development. For these reasons, the substitution of
new energy projects (Strategy (b)) is neither effective nor practical for reducing risk.
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Second, additional new energy projects always enhance a system probability more effectively
than additional nuclear power projects. This is because project probabilities of new energy projects
are 1.0, while those of nuclear power projects are less than 1.0. In addition, although all nuclear
power projects, including additional projects, are assumed to have an identical project probability,
each project can have a different project probability in realty. Therefore, the utilities launch easy
projects fast and tough ones later and additional nuclear power projects have smaller probabilities
than ongoing projects. For this reason, when the utilities launch additional nuclear power projects,
the system probabilities are indicted by the lines of M=0 but the lines indicate the upper limits of
system probabilities.
In contrast, when project probabilities of nuclear power projects are not uniform, adding new
energy projects enhances system probabilities more effectively than when nuclear power projects
have an identical project probability. This is because system probabilities depends strongly on the
most risky project. For instance, when 5 of 6 nuclear power projects have a project probability of
1.0 but one of them has a probability of 0.531, the system probability is 0.531. Similarly, when 6
projects each have a project probability of 0.9, the system probability is 0.531. In those cases,
adding a new energy project enhances the system probability from 0.531 to 0.951 in the former
case, to 0.886 in the latter case. Consequently, the lines of M=I and M=2 indicate the lower limit
of system probabilities of adding new energy projects. Foe this reason, adding new energy projects
(Strategy (c)) is more effective than adding nuclear power projects (Strategy (a)).
In conclusion, it is not advisable to either drop or add nuclear power projects. The most
effective strategy is to launch additional new energy projects. That is, Strategy (c) is most
advisable among Strategies (a), (b), (c), and (d).
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Table 4-3 Overall Probability (L=6, F=0.9)
M
0 1 2
5 - 0.590 0.919
N 6 0.531 0.886 0.984
7 0.850 0.974 0.997
N; Numbrt of Nuclear Power Projects
M; Number of New Energy Power Projects
Table 44 Overall Probability (L=6, F=0.6)
M
0 1 2
5 - 0.078 0.337
N 6 0.047 0.233 0.544
7 0.159 0.420 0.710
N; Numbrt of Nuclear Power Projects
M; Number of New Energy Power Projects
Table 4-5 Overall Probability (L=11, F=0.9)
M
0 1 2 3 4
9 - - 0.387 0.775 0.947
10 - 0.349 0.736 0.930 0.987
N 11 0.314 0.697 0.910 0.981 0.997
12 0.659 0.889 0.974 0.996 0.999
13 0.866 0.966 0.994 0.999 1.000
N; Numbrt of Nuclear Power Projects
M; Number of New Energy Power Projects
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Figure 4-6 Enhancing Overall Probability (L=6)
4.5 ANALYZING THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND RISK
The analysis of risk control strategies reveals that new energies reduce the risk of failing C02
control mainly due to the predictable lead-time. New energy sources, however, raises the cost of
power generation and, consequently, the cost of C02 abatement. The optimal technology choice
depends on the trade-off between cost-effectiveness and risk. This section develops and
demonstrates a framework to incorporate the trade-off into technology choice.
Methodology
The basic methodology used to evaluate the trade-off is the discounted cash flow analysis
(DCF), which calculates the present value of the profit in power generation. The profit, however, is
subject to uncertainty due to the volatility in the lead-time. To incorporate uncertainty into
technology choice, the analysis estimates the expected mean value of the profit, assuming the
probability distribution function of the lead-time.
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Though the expected mean value is the most likely value of the profit, the actual profit may
fluctuate around it. Therefore, the analysis estimates the standard deviation and the interquartile
range of the profit, assuming first order approximation, or Gaussian approximation.
Third, the profit depends on assumptions such as the average lead-time and cost of new energy
power generation. The scenario analysis and the sensitivity analysis of important parameters are
performed to show how assumptions affect technology choice.
The analysis estimates the expected mean value of C02 emissions as well as profit. The goal
of the analysis is to shed light on the trade-off between cost-effectiveness and risks of technology
choice. To this end, the analysis plots the relationship between the expected profit and system
probabilities of C02 controls or expected C02 emissions.
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
The discounted cash flow analysis adopted in this thesis consists of four parts:
· Assumptions of electricity demand
· Probabilities of nuclear power plant development
· Expected mean value of profit
* Present values of expected profit
Assumptions of Demand and Purchase of Make-up Electricity
DCF analysis adopts the same assumptions as Section 4.3 and 4.4. The utilities build 20
nuclear power plants between 2002 and 2011, 9 of which are commissioned by 2006. The DCF
analysis assesses the profits and risks of the remaining 11 plants. For simplicity, 6 independent
projects are assumed to build 11 plants from 2006 to 2011. Consequently, each project builds 1.83
plants on average or produces 9460x1.83=17,340 GWh per year. The demand of electricity is
described as:
[0 t= 0- 7 (1998-2005)
D(t) = 17,340x(t - 7) t = 8 - 13 (2006 - 2011)
[17,340 x 6 = 104,040 t = 14 - (2012 - )
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where
D(t) = the annual demand of electricity [GWh/year]
As discussed in Section 4.4, launching additional new energy projects is the most effective
strategy for reducing risks. For this reason, the utilities are assumed to launch additional new
energy projects instead of dropping or adding nuclear power projects. We assume that new energy
power plants are commissioned by the year 201 1.
The output of nuclear power plants is obtained from the expected mean value of the installed
capacity. When the total output of nuclear power plants and new energy power plants is smaller
than the demand of electricity, the utilities purchase electricity from independent power producers
to make up the capacity deficit. When the utilities purchase electricity from the year 2012 onward,
the utilities have to pay the penalty for emitting C02 because independent power producers
produce make-up electricity from fossil fuels, emitting C02 into the atmosphere.
The DCF analysis assumes two contracts to purchase make-up electricity; a one-year contract
and a long-term contract. Under a one-year or a short-term contact, the utilities can cancel the
contract held with independent power producers when the utilities commission nuclear power
plants. For instance, if the utilities commission no project in the year 2006, they hold the contract
to purchase make-up electricity of 17,340 GWh. If two nuclear power plant projects are
commission in the year 2007, they can satisfy the demand for the year 2007; therefore, the utilities
cancel the contract held in 2006.
By contrast, under a long-term contract the utilities must continuously purchase electricity from
independent power producers. In this example, once the utilities sign a contract for the year 2006,
the utilities must also purchase the same amount of electricity in the year 2007, which would supply
half of the demand. The output of nuclear power plants would supply the rest of the demand, even
if two nuclear power plant projects are commissioned.
For both contracts, when the sum of nuclear power plants, new energy power plants and make-
up electricity exceeds the demand, nuclear power plants reduce output while new energy power
plants produce electricity at full capacity so that the total output balances the demand.
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Probabilities of Nuclear Power Plant Development
Assuming that the lead-time of nuclear power projects is lognomaly distributed, project
probabilities can be obtained from a probability distribution function. System probabilities, which
are defined as " 'n' of 6 projects are completed not later than 2011," are obtained from the product
of project probabilities.
t 1l 1 (In(x)-n)2
F(t) = a .-- e 2(a2 dx
P(n,t)= 6 C, F(t)" (1- F(t))6 - "
where
F(t) = the project probability that a project are completed not later than "t" [-]
P(n,t) = the system probability that "n" of 6 projects are completed not later than "t"[-]
Sort-Term Contract
Under a short-term or a one-year contract, the output of nuclear power plants depends on the
number of projects commissioned. The output of new energy power plants are exogenously given
by the strategy for reducing risk. The DCF analysis calculates the demand and the output of new
energy. Then, it calculates the probabilities of nuclear power plant development and the expected
mean values of the output of nuclear power projects. Finally, it calculates make-up electricity
needed to satisfy the demand for electricity.
Expected mean values of profit
The cost of new energy power generation is easy to calculate because new energy projects have
little uncertainty. Under a short-term contract, the utilities are assumed to have built all new energy
plants by the year 2011. Their cost can be obtained by multiplying the unit cost of power
generation by the output.
CE(t) = cE x E(t)1000
0 t = 0- 12 (1998 - 2010)
E 17,340 x M t= 13- (2011- )
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where
CE(t) = the cost of new energy power generation [billion yen]
CE = the unit cost of new energy power generation [yen/kWh]
QE(t) = the output of new energy projects [GWh]
M = the number of new energy power projects [-]
For nuclear power projects, the DCF analysis evaluates the expected mean values of their cost.
They are obtained by multiplying the costs and the probabilities. Their output, however, is equal to
the difference between the demand and the output of new energy projects when the total output
exceeds the demand.
6
E(CN (t)) = C N (n, t) P(n, t)
l1=0
CN(n,t) = CN xQN(n,t)
1000
f17,340 x n 17,340 x n < D(t)- QE(t)
QN ( t) lD(t) - QE (t) 17,340 x n > D(t) - QE(t)
where
E(CN(t)) = the expected mean value of the cost of nuclear power generation [billion yen]
CN(n,t) = the generation cost of "n" nuclear power projects [billion yen]
CN = the unit cost of nuclear power generation [yen/kWh]
QN(n,t) = the output of "n" nuclear power projects [GWh]
The costs of make-up electricity and the penalties for emitting C02 are similar to the costs of
nuclear power generation because they depend on the expected mean value of nuclear power
output.
6
E(C (t)) = C (n,t) P(n, t)
ii=0
61
C M(n,t) = x t)
1000
QM(n,t) = D(t)- QE(t)- QN(n,t)
where
E(CM(t)) = the expected mean value of the cost of make-up electricity [billion yen]
CM(n,t) = the cost of make-up electricity when "n" nuclear power projects are completed
[billion yen]
CM = the unit cost of make-up electricity [yen/kWh]
QM(n,t) = the quantity of make-up electricity when "n" nuclear power projects are completed
[GWh]
The penalties depend on the charge of C02 emissions per unit of carbon and C02 intensity of
make-up electricity:
6
8((C (t))= ZCp(n, t) P(n,t)
11=0
CP XQM(n,t)
cP(n,t) = 11000
t = 0 - 13 (1998 - 2011)
CrP = _ Y t=14- (2012- )
1000000
where
E(Cp(t)) = the expected mean value of the penalty of emitting C02[billion yen]
Cp(n,t) = the penalty of emitting C02 when "n" nuclear power projects are completed [billion
yen]
cp = the charge of C02 emission per unit electricity [yen/kWh]
y = the charge of C02 emission per unit carbon [yen/t-C]
71 = the C02 intensity of make-up electricity [g-C/kWh]
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In addition to the cost of power generation, transmission and distribution costs are also
considered. Because the total output is equal to the demand, other costs are obtained by
multiplying the unit cost and the demand:
C. (t) c x D(t)
1000
where
Co(t) = the other costs such as transmission and distribution [billion yen]
Co = the unit other costs[yen/kWh]
Similarly, we obtain the revenue by multiplying the price of electricity by the demand:
R(t) = f x D(t)
1000
where
R(t) = the revenue of power generation [billion yen]
f = the price of electricity [yen/kWh]
The profit can be obtained from the difference between the revenue and the total costs:
G(t) = R(t) - CT(t)
Ct(t) = CE(t) + E(CN (t)) + E(CM (t)) + E(Cp(t)) + Co(t)
where
G(t) = the profit of power generation [billion yen]
CT(t) = the total cost of power generation [billion yen]
Finally, the present values of the profit are obtained by discounting the profit at the long-term
discounting rate. Because there is no cash flow until 2006, the focus of the DCF analysis is on 20
years from 2006 to 2025 ( t=8-27):
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20 G(t)
PV(G) = E ( )T
T=I (1+ r)
T t -7
where
PV(G) = the present value of the profit [billion yen]
r = the long-term discount rate [-]
Expected Mean Values of C02 Emission
The expected mean value of C02 emissions depends on the quantity and the C02 intensity of
make-up electricity the model calculates. The cumulative C02 emissions are calculated from 2012
to 2025 (t=14-27) because C02 emission are controlled from:
27
E(W) = E(w(t))
t=14
E(t)) Y = QM(n, t) P(n, t)
( nO 1000000
where
E(W) = the expected mean value of cumulative C02 emission [million t-C]
E(w(t)) = the expected mean value of C02 emission in the year "t" [million t-C]
TI = the C02 intensity of make-up electricity [g-C/kWh]
Long-term Contract
Under a long-term contract, we assume that the utilities build new energy plants in the years
2009, 2010, and 2011. This is because, once the utilities hold a long-term contract, the plants
commissioned later can not supply electricity. Therefore, the utilities build new energy power
plants before they execute a long-term contract. For instance, when the utilities build three new
energy projects, the first project will commission a plant in the year 2009, the second in 2010, and
the third in 2011 so that the utilities can build new energy power plants from three projects without
any conflict with a long-term contract:
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O O 0I 0 J17,340
0 17,340 17,340 x 2
7,340 1 17,340x 2 17,340 x 3
(M=1) (M=2) (M= 3)
t = 0 - 10 (1998 - 2008)
t = 11 (2009)
t = 12 (2010)
t=13- (2011 )
The output of nuclear power projects depends on the history of plant development as well as
the number of commissioned projects. Therefore, with the aid of an event tree, the DCF analysis
calculates the possible phases of plant development and their probabilities. Then, it calculates the
expected mean value of make-up electricity and the output of nuclear projects. An appendix shows
the phases of possible plant development and the calculation of their probabilities. We obtain the
expected cost of make-up electricity by multiplying the quantity of make-up electricity by the
probabilities:
E(C M (t)) = C M (m,t) PM (m,t)
ni=O
(m, t) = CM XQM(m,t)
CM(m,t) 10001000
QM (m,t) = 17,340 x m
where
E(CM (t)) = the expected mean value of the cost of make-up electricity [billion yen]
CM (m, t) = the cost of make-up electricity when "m" long-term contracts are held [billion yen]
PM (m, t) = the probability of "m" long-term contracts being held [-]
Q M (m, t) = the quantity of make-up electricity when "m" long-term contract are held [GWh]
E(CN(t)) = ZCN
nm=0
CN(^Mt)- CN X QN(m,t)
C(m,t) = c 100000
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QE(t) =0,
(M =0)
(m, t) P(m, O)
QN(m,t) = D(t) QE(t)- M(m,t)
where
E(CN (t)) the expected mean value of the cost of nuclear power generation [billion yen]
CN (m, t) = the cost of nuclear power generation when "m" long-term contracts are held [billion yen]
QN (m, t) = the output of nuclear power projects when "m" long-term contract are held [GWh]
The other calculations of a long-term contract are the same as those of a short-term contract.
Table 4-6 shows parameters of the DCF analysis.
Table 4-6 Parameters of the Cost Model
Costs of Power Generation
[yen/kWh] [cent/kWh]*
Rate of Electricity 18.81 15.01
New Energies 15 - 30 12 - 25
Nuclear 10.12 8.43
Make-up 14.00 11.67
T&D 1.46 1.22
Penalty 0 - 6** 0 - 5
(0 - 30,000 [yen/t-C]) (0 - 250 [$/t-C])
Discount Rate 7.2[%]
* Exchange Rate = 120[yen/$]
** C02 Intensity of Make-up = 200[g-C/kWh]
Analyzing Uncertainty
The DCF analysis depends on certain assumptions. To analyze the influence of these
assumptions, the model examines three scenarios of nuclear power plant development and the
sensitivities of the costs of new energy power generation and the penalty of emitting C02. In
addition, the DCF analysis estimates the approximate range of possible profit. Table 4-7
summarizes a framework for the analysis
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Table 4-7 Framework of the Analysis
Contract to Purchase Make-up Electricity
Short-term Contract Long-Term Contract
Strategy Scenarios Sensitivity Analysis Results
for Reducing Risk Nuclear Power Cost of Penalty of
(N, M ) Plant Development New Energies Emitting C02
System Probability of
(6, 0) Optimistic higher igher C02 Control
(6, 1) Expected
( 6,2 ) Moderate C02 emission
( 6, 3 ) Present Value of
Pessimistic lower lower Expected Profit
Approximated
Standard Deviation
Interquartile Range
M It cE cp P, W, G, cy, G25%, G75 %
Exogenous Inputs Endogenous Outputs
Scenario Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Development
There are divided views on nuclear power plant development. The MITI expects that 20
nuclear power plants will be commissioned by 2010, while an expert from the utilities states that 11
of 20 plants is the best they can do. In other words, the utilities anticipate that 5 of 6 projects will
not be completed by 2011 while the MITI expects that all 6 projects will be completed by then.
Because there is no consensus on the future of nuclear power plant development, it is difficult to
make an assumption about the probability of plant development.
For this reason, the DCF analysis examines three scenarios of nuclear power plant
development; optimistic, moderate, and pessimistic scenario. The optimistic scenario assumes that
5 of 6 projects will be completed by 2011. Consequently, the expected mean value of completed
projects is 5.0. The expected mean value of the moderate and pessimistic scenarios is 3.5 and 2.0
respectively.
Table 4-8 summarizes the assumptions of these three scenarios. To simplify, we will assume
that all scenarios have the same relative error, which is the ratio of standard deviation to mean, and
that the relative error is equal to that of the distribution of the partial lead-time discussed in Section
4.2. For instance, the moderate scenario expects that 3.5 projects will be completed or 6.4 plants
will be commissioned. Because it assumes that 9 other plants are commissioned without delay, a
total of 15.4 plants should be commissioned. Because these three scenarios have the same relative
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error, the mean and the dispersion of the lead-time of the pessimistic scenario is larger than that of
the,. optimistic scenario.
The average rate for commissioning nuclear power plants is 1.82 plants per year for the
optimistic scenario, 1.54 plants per year for the moderate scenario, and 1.27 plants per year for the
pessimistic scenario. As discussed in Section 4.3, the past average is 1.65 plants per year. The rate
of the optimistic scenario is higher than that of the past average by 10%, while those of the
moderate and pessimistic scenarios are smaller by 7% and 23% respectively.
The probability of a project being completed by 2011 are 0.83 in the optimistic scenario, 0.58
in the moderate scenario, and 0.33 in the pessimistic scenario. The system probability of 6 projects
being completed is 0.33 in the optimistic scenario, 0.04 in the moderate scenario, less than 0.01 in
the pessimistic scenario.
Table 4-8 Scenarios of Nuclear Power Plant Development
Expected Mean Value Distribution of the Lead Time
Projects* Plants** F20 11 t[yearl A cr c/p
Optimistic 5.0 18.2 0.83 9.74 2.28 0.30 0.13
Moderate 3.5 15.4 0.58 12.13 2.50 0.33 0.13
Pessimistic 2.0 12.7 0.33 15.16 2.72 0.36 0.13
* The utilities launches 6 projects.
** The utilities plan to build 20 plants and 9 of them are assumed to be build.
Sensitivity Analysis of Penalty and Cost of New Energy Power Generation
The costs of new energy power generation are also subject to uncertainty because they can
decrease in the future due to technology innovations, economies of scale, learning effects, and
market competition. The peallty for emitting C02 is decided by a regulatory agency. Opinion is
divided on the appropriate penalty.
To evaluate the influence of these parameters, the DCF analysis examines the sensitivity of
them in relation to the profit. The cost of new energy power generation varies from 15 yen per
kWh to 30 yen per kWh. They are roughly 1.5 times and 3.0 times higher than that of nuclear
power generation.
To determine the penalty for C02 emissions, the Environmental Agency of Japan (EAJ) issued
the analysis of carbon tax (EAJ, 1997b). The EAJ examines carbon tax raging from 3,000 yen per
t-C to 30,000 yen per t-C (25 [$/t-C] - 250 [$/t-C]). While there are a number of studies about
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carbon tax, the carbon tax used to stabilize C02 emissions in Japan is generally higher than that of
the US. This is because the marginal cost of C02 reduction in Japan is higher than that of the US.
For instance, the Electric Research Center of Japan estimates that the necessary tax level should
amount to 4,000 yen per t-C (33[$/t-C]) in 1990 and rise to 64,000 yen per t-C (533[$/t-C]) by 4000
yen every year until 2005 (Yamaji, 1990). The estimates of other studies range roughly from
17,000 yen per t-C to 63,000 yen per t-C (140 [$/t-C]) - 525 [$/t-C]) (EAJ, 1997c).
The influence of the penalty also depends on the C02 intensity of make-up electricity. As
discussed in Chapter 3, C02 intensity depends on the type of fuel used and the thermal efficiency
of power generation. For simplicity, the model assumes that make-up electricity has the C02
intensity of 200 g-C per kWh, which is higher than that that of LNG-buming power plants and
lower than that of coal-burning power plants. In that case, the effect of the penalty on power
generation costs is roughly 0.6 yen per kWh - 6 yen per kWh ( 0.5 [cent/lWh] - 5 [cent/kWh]).
Evaluating the Range of Possible Profit
Though the average lead-time is assumed in these three scenarios, the actual lead-time can
fluctuate. Thus, the expected profit may also fluctuate around the expected mean value. To
estimate the range of possible profit, the DCF analysis evaluates the standard deviation of the profit,
assuming Gaussian approximation. With a Gaussion distribution, the variance of expected profit is
approximately (Morgan, 1990):
2 'tG 2
where
c G = the standard deviation of the expected profit "G"
at = the standard deviation of logarithms of the lead time "u"
The partial derivative is estimated as the ratio of the change in profit to the change in lead-time:
E G G(po + ) - G(g)
'CL-]' JC
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Assuming approximate standard deviation, the DCF analysis evaluates the interquartile range
of expected profit, which is the rage between the lower 25% and the upper 75% of profit. The
profit between them has a probability of 0.5.
4.6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 show the examples of the DCF analysis of a short-term and a long-
term contract respectively. A sold line denotes the demand of electricity analyzed in the DCF.
Square points denote the expected output of 6 nuclear power projects, while solid ones denote that
of 6 nuclear power projects and 2 additional new energy power projects. Consequently, the
difference between the demand and the output represents the quantity of make-up electricity. Bar
charts represents the present values of expected annual profits.
For a short-term contract, the total output continuously increases until 2025 because the utilities
may cancel the held contracts when additional nuclear power plants are commissioned. For a long-
term contract, however, the total output does not increase after 2011 because the utilities must
purchase make-up electricity once the utilities agree to a long-term contract. In the moderate
scenario, for instance, make-up electricity reaches almost half of the demand when the utilities
launch no new energy projects.
In reality, the results may fall in the middle because the utilities can substitute their thermal
power projects for nuclear power projects. When a nuclear power project is behind schedule, the
utilities move up their thermal power project instead of purchasing electricity to make up the deficit
capacity. This rearrangement of power plant development schedules has the same effect as a short-
term contract. When they move up thermal power plant projects, the utilities can commission
nuclear power plants later.
Actual contracts with independent power producers are long-term ones. After the amendment
to the Electricity Utility Industry Law in 1995, the utilities have held contracts to purchase
electricity with independent power producers. The contracts are fifteen-year contacts. There are
neither one-year nor short-term contracts held.
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For these reasons, the actual outcome is falls between that of a one-year contract and that of a
long-term contract. A one-year contract and a long-term contract are the extreme cases that most
clearly demonstrate the influence of the delay of nuclear power plant development.
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System Probabilities of C02 Control and Expected C02 Emissions
Figure 4-9 shows system probabilities, which are defined as "6 projects that are completed not
later than 2011." The effect of new energy power projects is an S shape. When system
probabilities are low, new energy projects have little effect on the enhancement of system
probabilities. For instance, new energy projects have virtually no meaningful effect on system
probabilities in the moderate and pessimistic scenarios of a long-term contract.
By contrast, new energy projects have the most significant effect on medium system
probabilities. For instance, adding a new energy project enhances a system probability from 0.33 to
0.74 in the optimistic scenario of a short-term contract. The effect of new energy projects,
however, diminishes progressively with the increase of system probabilities. The third added
project increases the system probability from 0.94 to 0.99.
Generally, the effects on system probabilities of a short-term contract are more significant than
for a long-term contract. This is because it is only when the utilities complete all projects on
schedule that all nuclear power plants are brought on-line under a long-term contract. By contrast,
under a short-term contract, the utilities can bring all nuclear power plants on-line as long as they
complete six projects not later than 2011.
Figure 4-10 shows the expected mean values of C02 emissions. Generally, the effect of new
energy projects on C02 emissions is progressive. Consequently, while the effect on system
probabilities of a long-term contract is smaller than those of a short-term contract, the effects on
C02 emissions of a long-term contract is greater than those of a short-term contract. In the
moderate scenario, adding three new energy projects enhances system probabilities from 0.04 to
0.76 under a short-term contract, and from 0.02 to 0.14 under a long-term contract. But it decreases
C02 emissions by 35 million t-C of the former, by 1 18 million t-C of the latter.
The effect on C02 emissions is most significant in a pessimistic scenario of a long-term
contract. In that case, 4 of 6 nuclear power projects are not completed by 2022 and C02 emissions
are 200 million t-C without new energy projects. Launching three new energy projects decreases it
to 58 million t-C by 142 million t-C. When the utilities commission no nuclear power plants, C02
emissions reach 291 million t-C. The reduction of 142 million t-C accounts for half of it.
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In conclusion, new energy projects enhance most effectively the system probabilities of a high-
probability situation, such as optimistic scenarios or a short-term contract. In contrast, they
decrease most drastically with C02 emissions of a high-emission situation, such as pessimistic
scenarios or a long-term contract.
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Trade-off between C02 Control and Profit
Figure 4-11 -- Figure 4-18 shows the trade-off between profits and system probabilities of C02
emissions control or profits and C02 emissions. Figure 4-11 - Figure 4-14 shows the results of a
short-term contract while Figure 4-15 - Figure 4-18 shows the results of a long-term contract. The
cost of new energy power generation is 15 [yen/kWh] for Figure 4-11, Figure 4-13, Figure 4-15,
and Figure 4-17, 20 [yen/kWh] for Figure 4-12, Figure 4-14, Figure 4-16, and Figure 4-18.
The source of the trade-off is the gap in cost between nuclear power projects and new energy
power projects. While the cost of new energy power projects is definite, that of nuclear power
projects depends on the probability of nuclear power projects being completed. When the utilities
complete all nuclear power projects on schedule, the cost of new nuclear power project is equal to
that of nuclear power generation. When nuclear power projects are behind schedule, the utilities
purchase make-up electricity and pay the penalty for C02 emissions. In that case, the cost of delay
in plant development is written as:
Cost of Delay = (Cost of Make-up + Penalty of Emitting C02) x Probability of Delay
When the probability of delay is small, the trade-off depends on the gap in cost between
nuclear power generation and new energy power generation; 10 yen per kWh and 15 - 30 yen per
kWh. In contrast, when the probability is high, the trade-off depends on the gap in cost between
new energy power generation and delay. For instance, when the cost of make-up electricity is 14
yen per kWh and the penalty for CO2 emissions is 6,000 yen per t-C or 1.2 yen per kWh (50 [$/t-C]
or 1 [cent/kWh]), the cost of delay is 15.2 yen per kWh (12.7 [cent/kWh]). Because the probability
of delay is less than 1, the expected mean value of the cost is less than 15.2 yen per kWh. In that
case, when the cost of new energy is 15 yen per kWh (12.5 [yen/kWh]), the trade-off is virtually
negligible because the gap between cost of new energy power generation and delay is negligible.
By contrast, when the cost of new energy is 20 yen per kWh (16.7 [cent/kWh]), the trade-off is
clear over all probabilities. This is because the cost of 20 yen per kWh is higher than both the cost
of delay and the cost of nuclear power generation.
A short-term contract and a long-term contract have the basically same trade-off. But the effect
of new energy projects is more significant for system probabilities of a short-contract than those of
a long-term contract. Therefore, the marginal costs of enhancing system probabilities of a short-
term contract are smaller than that of a long-term contract. For instance, when the cost of new
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energy power generation is 20 yen per kWh in the moderate scenario, a new energy project
enhances system probabilities to 0.17 under a short contract and to 0.02 under a long-contract. At
the same time, it reduces the profit by 818 billion yen of the former and by 552 billion yen of the
latter. Consequently, the marginal costs of enhancing a system probability are 4,812 billion yen for
a short-term contract, and 27,600 billion yen for a long-term contract.
Similarly, the marginal costs of reducing C02 emissions in a long-term contract are smaller
than that of a short-term contract because C02 emissions of the former are reduced further than that
of the latter. In the preceding example, three new energy projects reduce C02 emissions by 48
million t-C under a long-term contract, and by 21 million t-C under a short-term contract. The
marginal costs of reducing C02 emissions are 12,000 yen per t-C (100 [$/t-C]) for the former and
38,000 yen per t-C (317 [$/t-C]) for the latter.
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Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 4-19 - Figure 4-22 shows the sensitivity analysis of the cost of new energy power
generation and the penalty for C02 emissions. For comparability, the sensitivities of the penalty
are translated into the penalty per unit electricity. That is, when C02 intensity of make-up
electricity is 200 g-C per kWh, the penalty of 5,000 yen per t-C is equivalent to 1 yen per kWh (the
penalty of 42 dollars per t-C is equivalent to 0.8 cents per kWh).
The sensitivity can be defined by the partial derivatives of profit with the cost and the penalty.
Because the partial derivatives are constant, the sensitivities are linear. Table 4-9 and Table 4-10
summarize the sensitivities in terms of kilowatt-hour equivalents. For the cost, the sensitivity is
proportional to the quantity of new energy output. Because the output of new energy projects is
definite irrespective of contracts, the sensitivity under a short-term contract is the same as that
under a long-term contract. New energy power plants, however, are commissioned at once in 2011
under a short-term contract, and one at a time from 2009 to 2011 under a long-term contract. For
this reason, discounting the output causes the small differences in the sensitivities between a short-
term contract and a long-term contract.
For the penalty, the sensitivity is proportional to the expected mean value of make-up
electricity purchased beginning in the year 2012. Under a short-term contract, the utilities cancel
contracts to purchase make-up electricity when they commission nuclear power plants. In contrast,
under a long-term contract, the utilities must continuously purchase make-up electricity once they
hold contracts. Therefore, the make-up electricity of the former is smaller than that of the latter and
the penalty of the former is more sensitive to profits than that of the latter. Similarly, the make-up
electricity of pessimistic scenarios is greater than that of optimistic scenarios. The penalty of
pessimistic scenarios is more sensitive to profit than that of optimistic scenarios.
When the utilities purchase roughly the same amount of make-up electricity as that of new
energy output, the penalty is as sensitive as the cost of new energy power generation in terms of a
unit kilowatt-hour equivalent. Practically speaking, however, the penalty has a limited effect on
profit. For instance, the gap in cost between new energy power generation and nuclear power
generation is some 5 yen per kWh or more. It is equivalent to the penalty of 25,000 yen per t-C
(4.2 cents per kWh is equivalent to 208 dollars per t-C). Therefore, unless a considerably high
penalty is imposed on C02 emissions, nuclear power dose not impair cost-competitiveness. The
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moderate penalty, however, still has a meaningful effect on fuel switching because the gap in cost
between coal, oil and LNG power generation is about 1 yen per kWh.
In summary, profits are sensitive to the cost of new energy power generation and insensitive to
the penalty. The moderate penalty has a meaningful effect on fuel switching but not on the
introduction of new energy power generation. For this reasons, it is also possible that moderate
subsidy has little effect on it. This is because the gap in cost between nuclear power generation and
new energy power generation is greater than the cost of delay
Table 4-9 Sensitivities of Cost of New Energy and Penalty (Short-term)
Sencitivity [billion yen/(yen/kWh)]
(6,0) (6,1) (6,2) (6,3)
Optimistic -18 -3 -0.4 -0.03
Penalty* Moderate -73 -28 -9 -2
Pessimistic -174 -99 -49 -19
Cost of New Energy 0 -110 -220 -331
* Penalty; l[yen/kWh]=5,000[yen/t-C] (42[$/t-C])
Table 4-10 Sensitivities of Cost of New Energy and Penalty (Long-term)
Sencitivity [billion yen/(yen/kWh)]
(6,0) (6,1) (6,2) (6,3)
Optimistic -118 -43 -10 -1
Penalty* Moderate -269 -172 -86 -30
Pessimistic -406 -307 -209 -117
Cost of New Energy 0 -110 -233 -368
* Penalty; l[yen/kWh]=5,000[yen/t-C] (42[$/t-C])
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Figure 4-19 Sensitivity Analysis of New Energy Power Generation Cost (Short-term contract)
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4.7 SUMMARY
This chapter investigated technology choice for C02 emissions control and demonstrated that
nuclear power is a risky choice due to the volatile lead-time. It entails the risk of failure of C02
emissions control within the time limit set up in tne COP3.
It also demonstrates that technology portfolios that combines nuclear power and new energy,
reduce the risk due to the predictable lead-time of new energy power plant development.
New energy, however, increases the cost of power generation and C02 emissions control. To
shed light on the trade-off between cost-effectiveness and risk reduction, the investigation
developed a framework to incorporate uncertainty into technology choice. It demonstrated that
technology portfolios reduce the risk in a number of different ways. When nuclear power plant
development has a modest or relatively high probability, technology portfolios enhance most
effectively the probabilities of C02 emissions control. However, they reduce a relatively small
amount of C02 emissions. So, the marginal cost of reducing C02 emissions is relatively high. On
the other hand, when nuclear power plant development has a relatively low probability, technology
portfolios slightly improve the probability but reduce C02 emissions most effectively. Hence, the
marginal cost of reducing C02 emissions is relatively low.
Profits are sensitive to the cost of new energy but virtually insensitive to the penalties of C02
emissions. The gap in cost between new energy power generation and nuclear power generation is
the predominant source of the trade-off.
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5. POLICY CHOICE
This chapter discusses policy choice for C02 control. It begins by analyzing how the utilities
choose an optimal technology portfolio. It shows that the optimal technology portfolio depends on
C02 control policy. Then, it analyzes the basic interactions between C02 control and the
deregulation of the utilities. It shows that the presence of certain policies can harmonize C02
control and deregulation. Finally, it proposes a tradable certification system for new energy power,
which would both ensure technological change and market-competition.
5.1 OPTIMAL TECHNOLOGY PORTFOLIO
Chapter 4 demonstrates the trade-off between cost-effectiveness and risk in a quantitative
fashion. But it does not state which of the optimal technology portfolios to choose. This section
analyzes how the utilities choose an optimal technology portfolio, depending on the relative
importance of cost-effectiveness and risk reduction. For the utilities, there are three criteria for
technology choice: C02 control, economy of power generation, and C02 abatement.
C02 Control
For C02 control, the predominating factor is the enhancement of system probability that all
projects necessary for C02 control are completed no later than 2011. The COP3 set up certain
legally-binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions. Japan must to reduce them to 6% below 1990
levels. Therefore, when C02 control becomes a legal obligation for the utilities and requires them
to build 20 "carbon-free" power plants to control C02 emission, the purpose of a technology
portfolio is to improve the system probability. In such a case, the optimal portfolio is to launch 3 or
more additional projects for new energy power.
Economy of Power Generation
For the 'economy of power generation, the predominating factor is the profit in power
generation. Because profit is often uncertain, there are some sub-criteria for technology choice: to
maximize the expected mean value of profit, to maximize the maximum possible profit, to
maximize the minimum possible profit, and to minimize the maximum gap between the maximum
and the minimum possible profit. Because new energy projects narrow the dispersion of possible
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profit, the minimum possible profit increases. In most cases, however, new energy projects reduce
the mean profit more substantially than they narrow the dispersion. For this reason, the minimum
profit without a new energy power project is greater than that with one or more new energy power
projects. To conclude, no matter what sub-criterion is applied, the optimal portfolio is to launch no
new energy projects.
The reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the cost gap between new energy and nuclear
power is greater than the cost of purchasing make-up electricity and the penalty for emitting C02.
For all practical purposes, the essential finding is that neither emission charges nor subsidies give
any incentive to introduce new energy power. Unless there is an extremely high penalty imposed,
nuclear power is more cost-effective than new energy power, even taking risk into consideration.
C02 Abatement
For this criteria, the optimal portfolio depends on how much the utilities are willing to, or are
able to, pay for C02 abatement. For instance, when the utilities voluntarily reduce C02 emissions,
the optimal quantity of C02 abatement depends solely on utilities' willingness to do so. When the
utilities have other options to control C02 emission, such as joint implementation and emission
permit trade, the optimal portfolio would be to equalize the marginal cost of C02 abatement with
those of the other options. In such a case, the equalized marginal cost is the maximum the utilities
can pay for new energy power generation.
In summary, the optimal portfolio depends on the relative importance between cost-
effectiveness and risk. That importance, in turn, depends on CO2 control policy. When building
"carbon-free" power plants becomes a legal obligation for the utilities, the predominating factor is
to enhance its probability. In contrast, economic incentives such as emission charges and subsidies
give no incentive to reduce risk or introduce new energy. When the utilities have several options to
control C02 other than new energy, the optimal portfolio equalizes the marginal cost of C02
abatement and other options.
5.2 INTERACTION BETWEEN C02 CONTROL AND DEREGULATION
Section 5.1 demonstrates that the optimal technology choice depends on C02 control policy.
C02 control policy, in turn, is closely interrelated with the deregulation of the utility industry.
First, the goal of deregulation is to reduce the price of electricity. Low prices, however, promote
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high consumption and, consequently, C02 emission. Second, cost minimization in a price-
competitive market may squeeze out technologies that are beneficial to C02 control but not as cost-
competitive. Third, emission control may be a barrier to entry into the utilities market because it
increases the cost of power generation while decreasing the demand and, consequently, the profit,
of power generation. Fourth, the existing utilities are almost exclusively responsible for the
development of nuclear power plants. A nuclear-leaning policy lays the obligation to control CO2
on existing utilities, leaving the obligation of other power producers vague. The unfairness of the
policy not only discourages the efforts of the utilities to reduce C02 emission but also disturbs fair
competition in the utility market.
For these reasons, C02 control policy should not only balance the trade-off between cost-
effectiveness and risk but also remain consistent with deregulation. To this end, the following part
of this section analyzes the basic interactions between C02 control and deregulation. The focus of
the analysis is the effect of price and technological change on C02 emission.
Deriving the Effect of Price and Technological Change on C02 Emission.
The goal of deregulation is to reduce the price of electricity because the prices of monopolized
utilities are higher than market prices. Under current regulations, the amount of profit the utilities
are allowed is calculated as a percentage of their expenditures. Therefore, cutting costs will have
the adverse effect of reducing profits, and the utilities have an incentive to invest more in their
facilities than is needed. This phenomenon, called the "Averch-Johson effect," raises cost above
the competitive level (Averch, 1962). In fact, while Japan's utilities received competitive bids for
new thermal power plants since the abatement of the Electricity Utility Industry Law in 1995, the
average contract price is lower than the avoid costs of the utilities by 20-30%.
On the other hand, C02 control increases the cost of power generation and the price of
electricity. Thus, the actual change in price depends on both the cost of C02 abatement and price-
competition through deregulation.
In turn, the change in price affects C02 emissions. When the price goes up, C02 emissions
decrease with the decrease of demand. When the price goes down, the demand increases. C02
emission, however, depends on the change in C02 intensity of electricity. When C02 intensity is
improved at the same time as a demand for electricity changes, C02 emission can be reduced. The
change in C02 emission is derived in the following equations:
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The amount of C02 emissions can be obtained by multiplying the electricity production and
the C02 intensity:
Eo = o Qo
E, = l Q1
where
Eo = the C02 emission without C02 control and deregulation [t-Carbon]
El = the C02 emission with C02 control and deregulation [t-Carbon]
1o = the C02 intensity without C02 control and deregulation [t-C/kWh]
rA, = the C02 intensity with C02 control and deregulation [t-C/kWh]
Qo = the electricity production without CO2 control and deregulation [kWh]
Q, = the electricity production with C02 control and deregulation [kWh]
The change in CO 2 emission can be obtained from the difference of the two. The electricity
production of Q, however, can be higher or lower than Q0, depending on the change in price.
Similarly, the CO 2 emission of El also can be higher or lower than Eo, depending on both the
change in electricity production and CO 2 intensity.
AE - -Q - Q0
where
AE = the change in CO, emission [t-Carbon]
The price elasticity of demand, Ep [-], is given as the ratio of the relative change in the demand,
induced by a unit relative change in the price.
P aQ
Q ap
When the elasticity is integrated, the following equation is obtained:
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(P Ep Q
o Qo
where
PO = the price of electricity without C02 control and deregulation [yen/kWh]
pi = the price of electricity with C02 control and deregulation [yen/kWh]
When the equation is substituted in the change in C02 emission, the following equation is
obtained:
AE = o.Qo .[a ( J (1 a _-
where
a = the ratio of C02 intensity [-]
When AE is taken as zero, "a break even point," at which the C02 abatement through the
improvement of C02 intensity is commensurate with the C02 increase through the demand
expansion, is obtained. That is, the lie line describes the condition where the improvement of C02
intensity is offset by the demand increase.
- : a break even pointPoa
The Price Elasticity of Demand for Electricity
Nagata estimated the long-run price elasticity of demand for electricity in Japan (Nagata,
1995). Table 5-1 shows the results of the estimation. Bohi and Zimmerman estimated the price
elasticity in the US (Bohi and Zimmerman, 1984). The US estimate reports a consensus short-term
elasticity of -0.3 and a long-term elasticity of -0.2 for residential consumers. No consensus
estimates for other sectors were reported. For residential consumers, the demand for electricity is
more elastic in Japan than in the US. The primary reason is that the price of electricity in Japan is
1.2 to 2.4 times higher than that in the US. The results of Bohi and Zimmerman indicate that
commercial and industrial sectors exhibit a more elastic demand for electricity in the US. By
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contrast, Nagata's results show residential consumers' demand is more elastic than other sectors in
Japan.
Table 5-1 Long-term Price Elasticity of Demand for Electricity of Japan
1994 Elasticity
Imillion kWhl I-]
Agriculture/Forestry 3,855 -0.1874
Fisheries
Mining,Manufacturing
Construction
Foodstuffs
Textiles
Paper,pulp
Chemical
Ceramics
Iron, steel
Nonferrous metals
Machinery
Other industories
Residential
Commercial
Passenger trasportation
Freight trasportation
Sub total
Weighted average
2,331
1,228
23,854
10,311
32,866
60,163
23,194
79,121
17,950
73,101
64,308
227,280
206,920
20,071
1,256
847,809
-0.1470
-0.8814
n.a.
-0.1442
-0.0420
-0.0672
-0.1095
-0.0371
-0.0624
-0.0655
0.0672
-0.2481
-0.1493
-0.1321
n.a.
-0.1289
Source: Nagata,1995 and JEA, 1996
Effect of Price and Technology Change on C02 Emission
Figure 5-1 shows the effects of the change in C02 intensity and the price on C02 emissions.
For simplicity sake, elasticity is assumed to be the weighted average of sectors. The vertical axis
indicates the change in price. When the cost of C02 abatement is higher than the cost reduction
through market competition, the price of electricity goes up. By contrast, when cost reduction
through deregulation is greater than the cost of CO2 abatement, the price goes down.
The horizontal axis indicates a ratio of C02 intensities, which represents the change in C02
intensity. In other words, it represents a technological change in power generation in terms of C02
control. When "a" is equal to 1, either no technological change takes place in power generation, or
technological change is offset by the expansion of such carbon-rich fuel burning power generation
as coal.
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A solid line represents a break even point. By definition, C02 emission does not change on the
line. In the area above the line, C02 emission increases. In the area below the line, it decreases,
particularly, in the area, "W," where both C02 emission and price decrease thanks to technological
change and market competition. Therefore, the area of"W" represents a win-win situation for C02
control and deregulation.
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0
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Figure 5-1 Effect of Price and Technological Change on C02 Emission
Policy Implications
For policy choice, the most important finding is that C02 control policy should consist of two
"policy vectors;" technological change and market-competition. Arrows in Figure 5-1 shows the
graphic concept of policy vectors. The origin represents the current condition. The first vector is
technological change, "T," where improved C02 intensity is a result of enforcement or
enhancement of technology changes. The second one is market-competition, " C ," in which the
price of electricity is driven down through price-competition. The third vector is the policy to be
adopted, " P ," which is the result of" T " and " C ." Figure 5-1 theoretically confirms the presence
of the policy vector, " P ", which harmonizes C02 control and deregulation.
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For instance, the average, which is the quotient of total revenue by total power generation, is
18.81 yen per kWh (15.7 [cent/kWh]). On the other hand, avoid costs, which the utilities have
announced in past bids, range from 9 - 17 yen per kWh (8-14 [cent/kWh]), depending on types of
power sources. The cost of base load is lowest thanks to utilization rates as high as 70%, while that
of peak load is highest due to utilization rates as low as 10%.
Assuming that the average avoid cost is 14 yen per kWh, this roughly accounts for 75% of the
electricity price. Contract prices in past bids are lower than avoid costs by 20% - 30%. In a
competitive market, price is equal to marginal cost. Consequently, assuming that the contract
prices are equal to the marginal cost of power generation, the price of electricity should be reduced
by 15% - 20%. The MITI is expecting that deregulation reduces the price by up to 20%. A
reduction of 20% is roughly equal to the results of past bids. In that case, C02 intensity should be
improved by 1% - 2% in order to stabilize C02 emission at the current level. In other words,
without any improvement in C02 intensity, C02 emission will increase. Similarly, without
market-competition, the price will go up when C02 control is enforced. For this reason, C02
control policy should promote technological change and market-competition simultaneously.
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5.3 TRADABLE CERTIFICATE OF CARBON-FREE POWER GENERATION
This section integrates technology choice with policy choice and proposes C02 control policy
as the ultimate recommendation of this thesis. The central issues of technology choice and policy
choice can be summarized as follows:
* Nuclear power is a cost-effective but risky option due to the volatile lead-time. The risk is
not negligible and reducing the risk is indispensable for C02 control.
* Technology portfolios, which combine nuclear power and new energy power, reduce the
risk as a result of the predictable lead-time of the latter. However, the trade-off for
reducing risk is increasing cost.
* Because of the large cost gap between nuclear power and new energy power, economic
incentive has little effect in the effort to introduce new energy power. Their binding
introduction is necessary for ensuring C02 control.
* The binding introduction, however, should be consistent with deregulation and vice versa.
Theoretically, the two can be harmonized as C02 control policy promotes introduction and
deregulation at the same time.
In the final analysis, the issue to be addressed is how C02 control policy can simultaneously
ensure new energy power and market-competition. As analyzed in Section 5.2, they are closely
related and at times can conflict. The conflict is produced when new energy power raises the cost
of power generation, reduces the profit, establishes a barrier to entry into a market, and stifles
market-competition. Therefore, if the introduction of new energy power generation becomes
profitable for ventures, it will encourage, as well as reduce the cost of, entrance into the market,
promote market-competition, all the while decreasing the cost of electricity.
In short, the key for successful policy is to create a profitable market for new energy power
generation. The weakness of the current policy is that it provides incentives for "cost reduction"
but allows little chance for "revenue generation." Solar power is an instance, where, through
government subsidy, incentive is provided to use an alternate form of power in order to reduce the
cost of electricity. Subsequently, the price of electricity goes down, and the incentive to reduce
costs decreases. In such a case, the government is required to increase the subsidy in order to
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maintain incentive. As a result, the solar power market will never privatize or expand. To correctly
promote the new energy market, there has to be a more tangible incentive and a much higher return
than simply reducing expenses. Motamen-Scobie points out:
For new investment, there is a tendency within industry to favour 'revenue
generation' projects against those for 'cost reduction' by requiring shorter
gestation and payback periods for the latter, even though the former is the dual of
the latter. Thus, energy efficiency projects tend to receive low priorities by
industry by requiring much higher return and faster payback periods for
them-sometimes as low as three months. It is possible that a supply shock may
need to occur to induce the market to invest and develop the required technology in
order to redress some of the current environmental imbalance. (Motamen-Scobie,
1993)
One workable policy would be the creation of effective demand while introducing competition
into the market. The American Wind Energy Association proposes the Renewable Portfolio
Standard (RPS) and several states are now preparing RSP legislation. RSP bills are also proposed
at the federal level (Table 5-2 and Table 5-3). Although the RSP was originally proposed to ensure
the utilization of renewable energy, it could serve this purpose as well. The AEA defines the RPS
as:
Renewable Energy Credits, or "RECs." are central to the RPS. A REC is a
tradable certificate of proof that one kWh of electricity has been generated by a
renewable-fueled source. RECs are demonstrated in kWh and are a separate
commodity from the power generation itself. The RPS requires all electricity
generators (or electricity retailers, depending on policy design) to demonstrate,
though ownership of RECs, that they have supported an amount of renewable
energy generation equivalent to some percentage of their total annual kWh sales.
For example, if the RPS is set at 5%, and a generator sells 100,000 kWhs in a
given year, the generator would need to possess 5,000 RECs at the end of that year.
(AWEA, 1997)
The objective of this policy is to ensure a minimum level of renewable energy in a way that
also promotes competition within the renewable energy industry. Under the RPS, the utilities either
produce electricity from renewable energy by themselves, buy it from others, or buy RECs from
others (renewable power producers and REC brokers). This market-based approach would allow
the RPS to be met in a cost-effective way. Government involvement would be limited to
monitoring purchasing RECS, as well as setting initial market regulations.
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The RPS would maintain competition among renewable power producers, rather than an initial
one-time bidding competition. Thus, it encourages power producers to continue efficiency
improvement efforts. RSP's major benefits are that it can: (1) guarantee the amount of renewable
energy introduction, (2) increase the economic efficiency of the introduction, (3) maintain a neutral
position among existing utilities and independent power producers, and (4) create an effective
demand for renewable energy technologies, which would promote technological change, cost
reduction though market-competition, economy of scale and learning-effect.
The same argument generated by the RPS holds true for new energy using the stated definitions
for "New Energy Credits (NECs)," or "Carbon-Free Energy Credits (CFECs)." The main problem
with C02 control is that it is quite impossible to introduce new energy into a market without a
binding obligation. The New Energy Portfolio Standard (NEPS) or the Carbon Free Energy
Portfolio Standard (CFEPS), which is the same certification tread system as the RPS, can guarantee
the amount of new energy introduction and ensure C02 control.
In addition, the NEPS or CFEPS could encourage new ventures to enter the utility market. This
is through the creation of effective demand in a situation where existing utilities have little price-
competitiveness in new energy power generation. For instance, the Tokyo Electric Power
Company, Japan's leading utility company, has carried out projects with wind power generation.
The costs of their projects are 43 - 46 yen per kWh (36 - 38 [cent/kWh]) (TEPCO, 1997). In
contrast, a small venture company, Yamagata Wind Power Generation Research Center CO.,
operates wind power plants of 400 kW. Though these plants are located in an area with relatively
low-wind, the cost of their plants is only 9 - 12 yen per kWh. Private capital was awarded by the
Agency of Natural Resource and Energy for this venture (NEF, 1998). This example suggests that
new energy market can indeed be profitable for new ventures.
In summary, the NEPS or the CFEPS involve two policy vectors; market-competition "C ,"
technological change "T ." Since they ensure market-competition and technological change at the
same time, they realize the win-win situation where C02 control and deregulation are harmonized
and cost-effectiveness and risk reduction are balanced.
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Table 5-2 RPS Employed by US Regulatory Authorities
Adopted By Renewables Requirement Note
Arizona Corporation 0.5%; takes effect in 1999, Solar only. Will create a 120-MW
Commission increasing to 1% in 2002 market for solar by 2002
Maine Legislature 30%; takes effect in March 2000
Nevada Legislature 2/l0ths of 1% rising to 1% by 2009. Half of the renewables must be
Takes effect January 2001 derived from solar resources.
Massachusetts Begins at existing levels as early as Increased levels must be supplied
Legislature 2000; grows by 1% in 2003 and 1/2% by new resources, including
per year thereafter to 2009. advanced biomass, landfill gas,
wind, solar, geothermal or ocean
technologies.
Source; AWEA 1997
Table 5-3 RPS Shares Proposed in electricity deregulation Bills before Congress
Bill #, Renewables Requirement * Notes
Author 2000 2001 2003 2005 2008 2010 2020
S.237 - - 5% 5% 9% 9% 12% Requirement rises to
Sen. Dale 12% in 2013. Large
Bumpers hydro eligible. Applies
(D-Ark.) to retailers.
S. 687 2.5% 3% 4% 5% 8% 10% 20% Increases 1/2% per
Sen. Jim year to 2005, then 1%
Jeffords per year to 2020.
(R-Vt.) Hydro not eligible.
Applies to non-hydro
generators.
H.R. 655 3% -- increases gradually -- 10% 3% requirement begins
Rep. Ed in 1998. DOE instructed
Markey to increase requirement
(D-Mass.) gradually to 10%.
Hydor not eligible. Applies
to generators.
H.R. 655 - 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% Hydro not eligible.
Rep. Dan Applies to non-hydro
Schaefer generators.
(R-Colo.)
* Non-hydro renewables currently supply about 2% of the US power. Source; AWEA 1997
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has considered both technology choice and policy choice for C02 control of Japan's
utilities. For technology choice, nuclear power is the main component of Japan's utilities. Nuclear
power is the least-cost technology for power generation and C02 control in resource-poor Japan.
However, lead-time is long and volatile due to difficulty in siting new power plants. Because the
COP3 set up the timetable for C02 control, C02 control must be implemented within a given time
period. However, with such a long and volatile lead-time, implementation within the established
timetable risks failure.
For policy choice, C02 control has the potential to conflict with deregulation of the utility
industry. Due to the heavy costs of emission control, a barrier to entry into the utility market is
established. In contrast, deregulation increases demand and, consequently, C02 emissions. A
nuclear-leaning policy discourages the efforts of the utilities to reduce C02 emission, and disturbs
fair market-competition.
For these reasons, technology choice and policy choice should cope with the trade-off between
cost-effectiveness and risk and the conflict between C02 control and deregulation simultaneously.
To this end, this thesis has developed and demonstrated a framework in order to illuminate the
possibilities. A financial economic analysis has been applied to technology portfolios of nuclear
power and new energy power. Then, it analyzed the conflict between C02 control and deregulation
in terms of prices, technological changes, and C02 emissions. Finally, it has proposed a tradable
certification of carbon free energy power generation such as new energy in C02 control. Among
the main findings were:
* It is possible that the risk of nuclear power plant development is not negligible. The
risk strongly depends on the most risky project. The basic statistics show that nuclear
power projects need to have a probability of more than 0.97 to commission 20 plants not
later than 2011 with a probability of 0.8. There is no concrete evidence, but considering
the plight of ongoing projects as well as past records, the probability of 0.97 is not viable.
When the probabilities of each project drops to 0.9, the probability of 20 plants being
commissioned diminishes to 0.5. Thus, it is safe to say that reducing risk is indispensable
for ensuring C02 control.
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* Technology portfolios of nuclear power and new energy power reduces the risk of
failing to control C02. New energies such as wind power have less difficulty in siting
new plants than nuclear power. Their lead-time is more predictable than that of nuclear
power. For this reason, new energy power enhances the probability of C02 control and
reduces expected C02 emissions.
* Technology portfolios reduce more effectively risks in moderate-probability
conditions and expected C02 emissions most greatly in low-probability conditions.
New energy projects have different effects on risk reduction and C02 reduction. The
relative importance of them, however, depends on C02 control policy.
* The trade-off between cost-effectiveness and risk arises mainly from the cost gap
between nuclear power and new energy power. Economic incentive has little effect in
introducing new energy power. The formation of new energy is most sensitive to profit,
while the sensitivity to penalty is negligible. This is because the cost gap is greater than the
cost of delay in plant development. Therefore, economic incentives such as subsidies and
penalties have little effect in introducing new energy power.
* Technological change and market-competition can harmonize C02 control and
deregulation. The analysis of the interactions among the two policies demonstrates that
C02 control and deregulation can be harmonized. In contrast, technological change
without market-competition raises costs while market-competition without technological
change increases C02 emission.
* A tradable certificate of new energy power generation ensures both technological
change and market-competition so that C02 control and deregulation can be
harmonized. The key for the successful introduction of new energy power is to create a
profitable market for it. A tradable certificate creates the effective demand in competitive
markets. The demand, paired with market-competition reduces the cost through price
competition, economy of scale, and learning-effect. At the same time, because the
certificate system ensures the presence of new energy, it enhances C02 control. Setting the
appropriate standard for the certificates balances the trade-off between cost-effectiveness
and risk.
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Although the analysis assumed that there is no risk involved with new energy, the methodology
developed in this thesis can apply to any combinations of technology options as long as the risks
and the costs are determined.
In addition, the methodology tacitly assumed one-for-all decisions in order to demonstrate
clearly the implications of technology portfolios. In practice, it can be applied to dynamic strategic
planning, which consequently makes decisions in response to the outcomes of previous decisions.
Because the lead-time of new energy power plants is shorter than that of nuclear power, the
decision to launch new energy projects can be postponed until the delay of nuclear projects is
sufficiently clear. For instance, due to the 8-year time frame for actual construction, the utilities
would have to begin construction of nuclear power plants at latest 2004. At that time, the utilities
can determine the number of new energy plants which would need to be built in response to the
number of nuclear plants which would not be able to go into operation by 201 1. As of yet, there are
few studies about a tradable certificate system in Japan (Sagawa, 1998). However, considering time
constraints, Japan is probably considering the introduction of the system before 2004.
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APPENDIX
Under a long-term contract, the output of individual nuclear power projects depends on both
the number of plants commissioned, and the history of plant development. Figure A-1 shows the
event tree of a long-term contract case. When no nuclear power project is commissioned in the year
2006, a long-term contract is held. Because 6 nuclear power projects are completed with a project
probability of F2oo6, the probability that a contract being held, P,2, is obtained as:
P,2 = (1- F06 )6
Consequently, the probability that no contract being held, P,1, is obtained as:
Pll = 1- P,2
In the year 2007, there are four cases. First, when at least one project is completed in the year
2006 and at least two projects are completed in total in the year 2007, no contract is held in the year
2007 (P2,). Second, when one project is completed in the year 2006 and no additional project is
completed in the year 2007, one contract is newly held in the year 2007 (P22). Third, when no
project is completed in the year 2006 and at least one project is completed is completed in the year
2007, one contract is continuously held in the year 2007 (P23). In that cast, even when more than
two projects are completed in the year 2007, the contract held in the year 2006 is not canceled.
Fourth, when no project is completed in the years 2006 and 2007, two contracts are held.
The probability of P22 is obtained by multiplying the probability that one project is completed
in the year 2006 and the probability that the remaining five projects are not completed in the year
2007:
P22= [6C 'F2006 (1 - F206)] xX (1- Y206)
The probability of the remainder of the projects being completed in the year 2007 is obtained as
the ratio of the difference in a project probability in the years 2006 and 2007 to that of 2006:
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F2 - F2007
Y2006= F-006
F2006
The probability of P2, is obtained from the difference between P,, and P22:
P21 = P - P22
Similarly, the probabilities of the other cases are obtained as:
P23 = P2 - P24
Therefore, the sum of P2,, P22, P23, and P24 is equal to 1 and the probability of one contract
being held is obtained by summing P22 and P23. Table 7-1 shows the summary of the procedures
and Table 7-2 shows the probabilities of long-term contracts in three scenarios.
2006 2007 2008
,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I I I
P31(0, 3-6)
(m, n)=(the number of contracts, the number of commissioned nuclear power projects)
Figure A-i Event Tree of Long-term Contracts
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Table A-1 Probabilities of Long-term Contracts being held
t
2006 2007 2008
PM(O, t) P1, P 21 P3 1
PM(1, t) P12 P 22+P 23 P3 2 +P3 3 +P3 5
PM(2 , t) 0 P24 P34+P36+P37
PM(3 , t) 0 0 P38
PM(4, t) 0 0 0
PM(5, t) 0 0 0
PM(6, t) 0 0 0
PM(O, t) 0 0 0
Table A-2 Results of Probabilities of Long-term Contracts being Held
t
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
PM(O, t) 0.8297 0.7067 0.6110 0.5197 0.4047 0.2438
PM(1, t) 0.1703 0.2449 0.2892 0.3262 0.3703 0.4178
PM(2, t) 0.0484 0.0898 0.1292 0.1784 0.2541
Optimistic PM(3, t) 0.0100 0.0234 0.0416 0.0729
PM(4, t) 0.0016 0.0047 0.0106
PM(5, t) 0.0002 0.0008
PM(6, t) 0.0000
PM(0 , t) 0.4751 0.2499 0.1416 0.0809 0.0409 0.0167
PM(l, t) 0.5249 0.4483 0.3428 0.2601 0.1869 0.1193
PM(2 , t) 0.3018 0.3733 0.3672 0.3393 0.2908
Moderate PM(3 , t) 0. 1422 0.2363 0.2955 0.3337
PM(4 , t) 0.0555 0.1191 0.1845
PM(5, t) 0.0183 0.0498
PM(6, t) 0.0052
PM(O, t) 0.2008 0.0494 0.0143 0.0044 0.0013 0.0004
PM(1, t) 0.7992 0.3120 0.1215 0.0522 0.0224 0.0097
PM(2, t) 0.6386 0.4057 0.2210 0.1158 0.0552
Pessimistic PM(3 , t) 0.4585 0.4281 0.3144 0.2093
PM(4 , t) 0.2943 0.3769 0.3537
PM(5, t) 0.1693 0.2839
PM(6, t) 0.0878
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